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The 1930s were a time of depression, unemployment, and economic
hardship, and one of the most difficult periods Americans have faced in
the twentieth century. The nation's cities found it particularly
difficult to deal with the consequences of the Great Depression, as
they were not equipped with the financial resources needed to overcome
the problems they faced. In Tulsa, Oklahoma, while officials were able
to make preparations that eased the initial impact of the downturn,
they soon realized that they were incapable of providing the necessary
relief for the people who lived there. When Franklin D. Roosevelt
offered his plan for a New Deal in 1932, Tulsans, like residents of
many cities in the United States, decided to give him the opportunity
and helped elect him as their president.
While they did not support all of the programs that Roosevelt and
the Congress developed for the nation's recovery, Tulsans were
satisfied enough to help return him to the presidency, as well as to
re-elect their Democratic congressman, senators, and mayor, throughout
the decade. During this period, the federal government designed
several New Deal programs, which were expected to reduce the economic
problems and to return the country to prosperity. What did these
programs mean for the city of Tulsa? Even more important, did they
have a positive, significant impact on the city's economic situation,
or were they hopelessly inadequate to help Tulsa return to its
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previously rich and prosperous position?
Current historical scholarship provides a growing number of
studies that attempt to deal with these questions for other urban areas
in the country. As historians attempt to measure the successes and
limitations of New Deal policies in specific geographic regions, as
well as on definable groups within society, it better enables them to
determine how the actions of the 19308 have led to the development of
society as it exists today. Rather than accepting the New Deal as
either a total success or a complete failure for reversing the economic
trends of the thirties, scholars find the significance of the impact of
the New Deal in what it contributed to the formation of the social,
political, and economic structures in which people live their present-
day lives. Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine the experiences that
occurred during the decade of the 1930s, and especially those that
affected federal and municipal relationships.
Historians initially concentrated their attention on northern
cities, largely because of their size and number and because of the
magnitude in which they were affected by the depression. Charles H.
Trout chose to examine Boston, Massachusetts, where he focused on the
impact of the New Deal's programs on the economy, political traditions,
and social life of that metropolis. There he found that the policies
conceived in Washington were not so radical or profound as most
scholars had believed. What resulted were federal programs that were
altered by municipal officials, under the influence of a strong
Democratic political machine, who changed them so that they more
closely conformed to their own needs.!
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Boston was made up of many different ethnic groups and it had a
sizeable contingent of union laborers. New Deal programs initially
brought substantial benefits to these people, especially through the
Public Works Administration (PWA) and the Civil Works Administration
(CWA). Nevertheless, leaders were able to manipulate federal funding
so that they could provide relief to the groups that would most
positively reinforce their own power. Ethnic rivalries also influenced
the amount of funding the city received, often in a negative way. For
these reasons, Boston was never able to return to its pre-depression
condition. Trout ultimately concludes that the New Deal accomplished
as much as anyone could have reasonably expected, but that deeply
encrusted local habits forced limitations on New Deal goals and
expectations. 2
In an analysis of the effects of Roosevelt's programs on
Baltimore, Maryland, Jo Ann Argersinger determines that the New Deal
failed to solve the problem of unemployment, but that this was
partially due to the fact that, as in other cities, programs and
policies were not as fully implemented as they were originally meant to
be. She emphasized the conservative application of the New Deal in
Baltimore, which was conditioned by traditional states-rights concerns,
a conservative Democratic party, racial and ethnic rivalries, a disdain
for public relief, and a persistent belief that all forms of public
relief should be temporary in nature. 3
While the New Deal had success in certain areas, such as in the
establishment of public housing and the reorganization of much of that
city's government, it also faced local opposition that limited the
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effectiveness of its programs and minimized its efforts to get the
public to give more substantial support to the unemployed. New Deal
programs led private agencies to become more concerned with the welfare
of the people, but did little to change attitudes relating to state
sovereignty and local prerogative. Argersinger concludes that the
final result for Baltimore was a mixture of old formulas of city
leaders with newer federal solutions, which led to a program of social
welfare that pointed at once to the possibilities and limitations of
the New Deal for that city.4
Bruce Stave's findings for Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania also support
the argument that the New Deal was not revolutionary, but rather had
certain successes and shortcomings. He determines that Pittsburgh
entered the 1930s as a city in economic and environmental decay and
political stagnation, and that it departed the decade in largely the
same condition. Within this context, however, a good deal of change
did occur. Democratic leaders in the steel city were able to replace a
firmly entrenched Republican machine with one of their own. They began
to use relief programs such as the Works Progress Administration (WPA)
for their own political purposes, by eliminating any of its workers who
did not support their party. Although the mayor was a Democrat, he did
not support New Deal programs and effectively worked to keep funds away
from the city. A large federal housing complex was eventually built,
but was disproportionately filled with black residents, a situation
that would be repeated in housing projects across the nation. s
A positive benefit of the New Deal came with the establishment of
a public housing authority, and the city's cooperation with it, which
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served as a prime example of the increasing federal-urban relationship
that developed across the nation during the decade. 6 It also brought
to the city much needed smoke control, urban renewal, and improved
highways. But in terms of social change, Stave concludes that
advancements were limited, basically because this was a program geared
at reforming a system rather than changing it. 7
In some cities, the New Deal was much more successful. According
to Lyle W. Dorsett, a great marriage existed between the leader of
Kansas City's political machine, Tom Pendergast, and the Roosevelt
government. Pendergast, an extremely powerful political boss, was able
to maintain a very large contingent of loyal voters for the president.
In exchange, the people of his city were rewarded with several
extensive relief projects. The New Deal built most of the Kansas City
skyline, including the city hall municipal auditorium, courthouse,
police station, and many other buildings. It also employed many
jobless people to do the work. Unlike eastern cities, whose
infrastructures were already in place before 1930, Kansas City was able
to create a beautiful business district of superior quality, and one
that was almost completely free to its citizens. Blacks also received
better treatment, as the discrimination involved in relief projects in
other places did not exist in Kansas City.s
Dorsett points out, however, that although the New Deal had a
great impact on this large urban region, its leaders also had an impact
on the New Deal. Had Roosevelt not received the support and loyalty of
the political machine there, it is unlikely that he would have been as
generous. At the same time, a citizen who did not support Pendergast
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could count on being left out of the benefits he was able to receive.
Still, the impact of the New Deal on Kansas City was significant in
many positive ways, often much more so than in other places. 9
Roger Biles, observing that historians have largely concentrated
on northern cities while ignoring the New Deal's impact on southern
ones, chose to examine Memphis, Tennessee, to see what the results of
Roosevelt's programs were there. His study is a response to those who
viewed the federal government's policies as having had the unintended
long-term effect of undermining traditional patterns in the South, and
laying the foundation of additional change there in the future. IO He
was interested in determining whether there was any basis for these
claims.
Biles examined the effects that New Deal policies had on Mayor
Edward H. Crump's domination of Memphis's Democratic political machine,
on that city's traditional racial practices, and on the existence and
status of labor unions there. He found that the New Deal did not
drastically alter life in Memphis, that its programs fell far short of
restoring prosperity, that unemployment was still a serious problem,
and that traditional norms regarding the social and cultural ordering
of the city were not significantly altered. 11 Memphis's Crump was
successful at using the New Deal to cement his traditional goals into
place, meaning that the legacy of Roosevelt's programs there was
characterized by continuity rather than change. 12 In a more recent
study, Biles examined the effects of the New Deal on the southern
cities of New Orleans, Houston, Atlanta, Dallas, Birmingham, and again
Memphis, and concludes with the same thesis of continuity for those
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places as well. 13
As these studies indicate, Roosevelt's New Deal, while often
considered revolutionary in theory, was usually limited to an important
degree in actuality, at least as far as its applications in many of the
nation's largest cities are concerned. The federal government's policy
of dictating only what amounts of money were to be spent in these
places, and not the specific manner in which the dollars were to be
used, often left the discretion of these decisions to municipal leaders
and to the political considerations that they faced. At the same time,
support for the president himself was generally at a very high level
throughout the decade of the 19308, and at its end, new, closer
relationships did exist between municipal governments and the federal
government that were a direct resul t of federal polic i (~~ i nt(~nded to
bring an end to the depression. Roosevelt's goal was not to take over
the control and operation of the machinery of the cities, but was a
more conservative attempt to provide resources that might allow their
citizens to help reach their own successful response to the hard times.
Ultimately, New Deal programs did not reach this goal themselves, as it
was the preparation for World War II that brought the nation and its
urban regions back to pre-depression prosperity. The New Deal,
therefore, was a changing, often contradictory plan that did offer
valuable help, but also faced insurmountable limitations.
These previous studies provide a framework and a setting for this
analysis of the impact and significance of the New Deal on the city of
Tulsa, Oklahoma. While not as broad in scope or detail as these other
studies, it will still contribute to the greater understanding of how
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large municipalities used the federal government to help get through
the Great Depression. Before such an examination can begin, however,
it would be helpful to consider other accounts of what the decade of
the 1930s was like for both the state of Oklahoma and for the city of
Tulsa.
Keith L. Bryant, Jr., provides one of the clearest, although
certainly not one of the most positive, appraisals of Oklahoma and the
New Deal. He found that the Dust Bowl's effect on agriculture and the
depression's negative impact on the oil industry were too much to
overcome even under the best circumstances. What existed in Oklahoma
was far from the best of circumstances, especially in relation to state
politics. William Murray, governor from 1931 to 1935, developed an
almost psychotic hatred for Roosevelt, and E.W. Marland, who succeeded
Murray, could not overcome his poor leadership abilities in his attempt
to bring the New Deal to Oklahoma. Both individuals contributed to the
state's negligible recovery.14
While he was able to raise some money for Oklahoma's relief,
Murray's efforts were not enough, and when federal funds arrived, he
abused them for political purposes to such an extent that control of
these finances was taken over by a federal agency. In the meantime,
many unsuccessful farmers were forced to head to California as poor
"Okies," while the state's other industries were also unable to
recover. Unemployment continued to rise, and relief programs for the
state were entirely inadequate, except for a strong Civilian
Conservation Corps (eee). The gubernatorial election of 1938 brought
the inauguration of conservative anti-New Dealer Leon Phillips, who
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tried to obstruct federal programs, especially the Grand River Dam
project. Ultimately, according to Bryant, while support for Roosevelt
remained high, there was no revolution or significant upheaval in
Oklahoma as a consequence of the federal response. 1S
Political ineptitude, in fact, seems to be the consensus of most
historians who have looked at Oklahoma during the depression era. In a
book by James Scales and Danney Goble, and in a compilation edited by
LeRoy Fischer, the stories of "Alfalfa Bill" Murray's shenanigans and
Marland's deficiencies, followed by Phillip's anti-New Deal regression,
are repeated. Scales and Goble discuss the eccentric Murray's attempt
at becoming president of the United States, and the ensuing hatred he
developed for Roosevelt, which negatively affected Oklahoma's ability
to procure relief. Murray did have his moments, however, such as when
he declared martial law over 3,106 oil wells in an attempt to get
control of the overproduction of petroleum that was causing serious
financial problems for his state. 16 The authors also describe the
growing importance of the Democratic party throughout Oklahoma during
the depression decade, although being a Democrat often did not mean
being a Roosevelt supporter.
In Fischer's book, Michael Everman discusses how Marland, once a
great oil man from Ponca City who had since lost his fortune, attempted
to bring the New Deal to Oklahoma early in 1935. Immediately it became
clear, however, that he would not be as successful with his state
program as Roosevelt had been with the national one. Marland found it
necessary to raise large sums of money through taxes, something the
legislature was unwilling to help him with. l7 While his motives were
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not selfish in nature, Marland was often criticized for using taxation
to help achieve his economic recovery goals. IS
Sara Bernson explains that these high taxes were what Leon
Phillips wanted to fight once he became governor in 1939. Bernson
writes that for two years Phillips battled against Roosevelt and the
New Deal. He was one of the few Oklahoma Democrats at the 1940
National Convention who did not back efforts to elect Roosevelt to a
third term. 19 The Oklahoma governor resented interference by
Washington with his state's sovereignty and tried to reverse these
developments. 2o Conservative politics, states' rights, and small
government were the hallmarks of what Phillips hoped to achieve.
Aside from these political analyses of the state during the
depression, one study that specifically deals with New Deal programs in
Oklahoma is Tanya Davis's analysis of work relief for women. She
concentrates on how these work relief programs began, what they
offered, and what women gained from them. Davis covers these projects
for counties throughout Oklahoma, especially as they related to women's
sewing rooms. She concludes that this program, under both the Federal
Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) and the WPA, reinforced the
existing definitions of male and female roles, but that it also gave
women a chance to be community builders. They were unable to establish
real economic changes for themselves, but women became prepared to
continue working during World War II. New Deal provisions for women
overall were quite limited, but Davis still believes that they had a
definite, positive impact. 21
How does the experience of Tulsa relate to the findings of these
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other studies? There have been a small number of authors who have
written about Tulsa's situation during the depression. In a project
funded by the city's chamber of commerce during the early 1970s,
William Butler wrote a general history of Tulsa in which he included a
brief discussion explaining that it was affected negatively by the
depression, especially with regard to the oil industry. Even so,
building there continued. Municipal funds combined with WPA grants
helped to construct a railroad station and two high schools. The
author believed that the biggest event of the decade was the Mid-
Continent oil strike of 1938. While Butler's coverage is important, it
is very general and says little about the political and social concerns
faced by the town's people. 22
Although his emphasis is on the early years of the depression,
before the election of Roosevelt and the implementation of New Deal
policies, Bobby Thomas Quinten has written a comprehensive, excellent
account of the social impact of the Great Depression on Tulsa. He
gives a well researched portrayal of the efforts of Tulsans to provide
relief for themselves during the difficult winter of 1929-30. He also
discusses the often positive attempts of city officials to coordinate
both private and public relief efforts and the early impact of the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) on the metropolis. Quinten's
interests lie in the social impact of the depression on religion,
family, and education. While he does not attempt to draw any
significant conclusions from his study, this work is still a very
valuable contribution to the understanding of what it was like to have
been a Tulsan during the difficult early years of the 1930s.
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Glen Roberson has produced an extensive history of the city of
Tulsa that covers the time from its settlement in the nineteenth
century until the late 1970s. He includes a chapter on Tulsa during
the depression in which he explains the early plans devised by the
town's leaders, who were trying to cope with the problems they faced.
Roberson also gives brief explanations of what some of Roosevelt's New
Deal programs did to improve conditions. The author argues that while
federal help was appreciated, it often was not enough, especially
during the relapse that occurred in 1937 when the president began to
eliminate aid throughout the nation. He found that a movement to
expand the aviation industry in the city was a critical factor in
helping it overcome its financial problems. 23
Each of these books contributes to this present study by providing
information on state and municipal conditions that existed during the
Great Depression. With such a background in place. this analysis of
the significance of New Deal programs on Tulsa will provide another
case study to scholarship focused on the impact of federal policies in
the 19308 on urban areas. By examining newspaper articles, summaries
of Tulsa Chamber of Commerce records, archival materials of local and
state politicians, city records, census materials, and other pertinent
sources of evidence, it will be possible to show that Tulsa, while not
being affected as critically as many other American cities by the
depression, still faced difficult economic times during the 1930s. The
New Deal provided a certain level of relief, but was insufficient for
bringing this urban region back to its pre-depression financial level.
This does not mean, however, that the New Deal did not leave its
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mark on Tulsa. As in cities such as Baltimore, Boston, and Memphis.
local considerations in Tulsa affected how federal dollars were spent,
although unlike some of those places, a true political machine was not
in control of municipal operations. Tulsa often showed vision and
leadership in being able to overcome problems it faced, such as those
that resulted from an ineffective state government. Therefore, in a
way that also affected other urban centers, this city was able to
establish a new relationship with the federal government that had not
existed before. In the future, Tulsa would turn directly to Washington
for services that it could obtain from the nation's capital.
Ultimately, it required a reliance on World War II spending to bring
the city back to a strong economic position. The war was important for
rejuvenating a stagnant oil industry and for building a large aviation
program. While the New Deal did not end the economic problems for
Tulsa, it did help change this southwestern metropolis into something
different than it had been before the Great Depression.
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SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION: THE DEPRESSION
IN TULSA BEFORE ROOSEVELT
The city of Tulsa was officially incorporated in 1903, making it a
quite young townsite in relation to others throughout the country.
This was due mainly to its existence among the last of the American
Indian lands. Its history became very important in the early 1900s,
when oil was discovered, bringing men from allover with the hope of
getting rich. In fact, oil became a central factor for the economy,
employment, and growth of Tulsa. Men with great foresight formed the
Tulsa Commercial Club in 1905 and travelled throughout the country by
railway in order to promote their new discovery. They wanted to bring
people, industry, railroads, and money to the town, so that it might be
developed into an important, dynamic place.!
They were highly successful. In 1901 Tulsa was home to about
1,000 people, but by 1930 this figure had skyrocketed to 141,258. 2
There were two major daily newspapers, an established college, a
railway station used by four major lines, a municipal airport, and
several skyscrapers. 3 While the oil industry dominated the economy,
both through extraction and refining, other industries grew here as
well. The need for construction was high, both for business and
housing, so that the population growth could be more easily managed.
In 1929 Tulsa ranked sixty-third in the country in total population, a
considerable feat for a place that was only twenty-six years old. 4
That year marked the last of what had been a period of continual
16
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economic expansion. The chamber of commerce issued a report that
discussed the favorable developments that had taken place. The city
had increased in inhabitants by 15,000 more than the figure for 1928,
and business and industry grew by a corresponding amount in practically
every field. The student body at the University of Tulsa had increased
from 150 to 1500 during the period 1920 to 1929. An ambitious city
bond issue program was developed with the purpose of building a second
bridge over the Arkansas River, providing another link between Tulsa
and its oil fields. The program also proposed the widening of the
original bridge, as well as appropriating approximately $2,000,000 for
capital improvements within the city proper. In 1929 alone there were
twenty-two new industries started in Tulsa with new capital of
$1,662,000, while at the same time, eighteen of the home industries had
engaged in material expansion at an investment of more than
$1,000,000. 5
Growth could be seen in other areas as well. From 1925 to 1929,
school attendance grew from 22,806 to 34,664, while the number of
telephones installed in homes rose from 27,430 to 41,269. While the
value of building permits issued decreased from $10,075,971 in 1925 to
$7,615,474 in 1926, it then doubled to $14,840,474 in 1927, while
dropping to a still impressive $12,132,090 two years later. The amount
of bank debits grew to slightly less than two billion dollars, up from
about $1.275 billion just four years earlier. The period 1925 to 1930
saw a rise in property assessments from $105,775,796 to $149,769,145,
an increase of 42 percent. 6 While other cities in the nation were also
experiencing at least moderate growth during the 1920s, these figures
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for Tulsa were still quite impressive.
The political structure of Tulsa at that time was based on the
mayor-commission form of government, with each member being elected as
an at-large candidate. From the time that the city charter became
official, there existed a tense rivalry between the Democratic and
Republican parties. The Democrats accused their opponents of being
puppets of the money interests, including the railroads, insurance
companies, and other large businesses. At the same time, the
Republicans argued that their rivals were interested in forming
unscrupulous political machines, such as those like Tammany Hall, and
running government for the sole purpose of furthering their own
concerns. 7
In reality, neither party was able to dominate city politics
throughout the early 1900s, although the Democrats did have the edge in
number of years that either of them was in control. In the constant
attempts to bring business and people to the city, both parties were
strong and worked together quite well. By doing so, they had the
ability to solve many problems, such as providing a good water system
and figuring out ways to build other municipal projects required to
support a growing population and industrial base. The city government,
chamber of commerce, and oil leaders continually managed to boost and
expand the petroleum industry, which was central to Tulsa's financial
position at that time.
In terms of political operations, however, neither party was
particularly strong, often working at odds with each other and finding
it difficult to gain the support of the people. 8 One of the reasons
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for this was the continual shifting of political preferences of a body
of constituents that never remained the same for any length of time.
Because of the nature of the development of Tulsa, often based on
periods of boom for the oil industry, there was a continual influx of
settlers from many different parts of the country, who came with
different political backgrounds. This often meant that the leadership
of both parties usually had difficulty in locating a solid base of
support. 9 Therefore, creating a clear municipal policy was not always
an easy thing to do.
One of the consequences of this situation was that officials were
often unable, if not also unwilling, to deal with the main problem of
the city - the growth of violence and lawlessness. Many felt that if
Tulsa was to hold the oil industry, it would be against their better
interests to close the saloons and brothels that many of the oil
workers liked to frequent. Because they spent long periods of time
away from loved ones back at home, these men, free of many social
restrictions, chose to ease their tensions and frustrations by spending
time at these places. This situation, when combined with the absence
of any effective temperance movement, left officials few options but to
allow such actions to continue. 10
This same lack of political authority also allowed an unusual
racial situation to develop. Blacks came to Tulsa for the same reasons
that whites did - because of the chance to obtain wealth and
opportunity. These blacks, however, did not engage in the drilling or
refining of petroleum or even act as laborers in the oil fields.
Instead, their opportunities lay almost exclusively in the service and
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domestic industries, as servants to the growing number of rich whites
in their homes or in other domestic businesses. They were totally
excluded from the profits that resulted from oil. ll
This did not mean that blacks were unable to make decent livings.
Because of all of the money in Tulsa that was associated with the
petroleum industry, these domestic jobs obtained by blacks brought
quite high pay relative to the same opportunities in other states.
Also, they experienced a new freedom from the oppressive economy of the
old South. 12 Tulsa was inhabited by a different group of people than
those who settled in other southern states. The discovery of oil
brought mostly people whose geographic origins were in the Midwest and
whose social roots were solidly middle class. Approximately one-half
of the men who held positions of leadership in the chamber of commerce
and city government had left families in Illinois, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania. They changed the cultural life of the city until it no
longer resembled other population centers of the American Southwest.
These people also brought with them racial attitudes associated with
the North, which were laced with strict ideas about segregation, but
did not include provisions for the total subjugation of blacks that
existed in much of the South. It was in this atmosphere that the Tulsa
black person was allowed to prosper economically.13
Within this context, however, blacks in the city still faced
important problems. Just because they were allowed to become
economically successful did not mean they were allowed to participate
with whites in any capacity. In fact. outside of their domestic
occupations, blacks were usually unknown to whites in Tulsa. While the
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racial relationship was unlike that of any other southern city, it was
not a harmonious one either. The city was not old enough to have in
place traditional racial relationships. The two races came together
here for the sole common purpose of material profit. Other than that,
they were totally separate. While segregation was enforced by city
ordinance, this probably was not necessary to keep the two groups apart
from each other. According to Francis Burke, a student of sociology in
the 1930s:
The Negro was known as the servant in the [white] household who
prepared the meals, washed the linens, and dusted the furniture,
who arrived at seven o'clock in the morning and left at eight at
night, who resided somewhere in or near Tulsa with others of his
race, who was a happy-go-lucky person who worked long and well. 14
This relationship, while not based on racial hatred, also did not
allow whites and blacks to be conscious of the social relations of
community growth. It meant that during the early years of the
depression, neither was aware of, cared about, or tried to do anything
about the problems each other faced. It also meant that within the
relative lawlessness of the period, an explosion could take place at
any time, as it did during the race riot of 1921. It also meant that
the two races found it difficult to work together during hard times,
such as those that came as a result of the depression. Until inclusion
of the blacks in urban relief was mandated by New Deal programs, the
two groups continued to live in Tulsa in ignorance of each other.
All of these factors help describe what Tulsa was like when its
citizens elected Herbert Hoover in 1928. While they also chose
Democrats for city offices, Tulsans were excited about Hoover's
progressive platform, and gave him better than a two to one majority
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over Al Smith. The city's people had a background that proved to them
that hard work and thrift would bring success, much as it had for the
earliest settlers of the town. They wanted to continue to increase
what they already had and to replace the goals they had achieved with
newer, more ambitious ones. The continual expansion of business and
growing industry all were signs of success when the depression came in
1929.
The principal problem that Tulsa faced was its reliance mainly on
one industry, that of oil. While others had been established and
continued to grow, ultimately they were connected to oil in some way.
During the 19208, profits from petroleum and everything associated with
it far exceeded losses, and as companies such as the Mid-Continent Oil
and Gas Association, the Natural Gasoline Association of America, and
the American Association of Petroleum engineers moved their home
offices to the city, Tulsa became internationally famous as the oil
capital of the world. IS
As this industry prospered, it created investment capital for
others as well. Therefore, at times when the oil market slowed down,
unskilled and semi-skilled laborers associated with it were able to
find alternative employment within these other job opportunities. By
transferring back and forth among these growing industries as they had
their boom periods, many workers were able to maintain their membership
in the active labor force of the city.16
The problems occurred when large numbers of unemployed workers,
specifically those who were involved in stagnating rural agricultural
areas, were attracted to Tulsa's industrial job market. Labor soon
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outstripped the number of available jobs, climaxing in 1929 when the
stock market crashed. I7 At the same time, overproduction in the oil
industry resulted in lower prices, lower demand, and fewer available
jobs. Other industries that depended on oil for their own growth no
longer were able to expand as they had. The result was a collapse in
Tulsa's economy.
For the city, the effects of the depression were not felt
substantially until the winter of 1930-31. By the end of 1930, the
figure for Tulsa's regular unemployed was 4,317, or about 7.5 percent
of the total labor population. IS By that time the impact began to be
realized fully, and public and private organizations were scrambling
for a solution. Mayor George Watkins quickly became convinced of the
severity of the problem. In early November 1930, he requested that
Harry Rogers, a local banker, head a mayor's committee on unemployment.
This idea was based on a suggestion made by President Hoover's
Committee of Employment, which suggested that the local committee
should be staffed with representatives of labor and industry, as well
as with public officials and local administrators. It advocated a plan
whereby all possible Tulsa employers would agree that no reductions in
the wage scale or the number of persons employed would take place in
their establishments except for reasons of inefficiency.19
Several employers participated in the plan, but ultimately they
could not keep enough employees on hand to make the program successful.
The Tulsa Community Fund, which had been established in 1924 and served
to help coordinate several relief agencies for the county, was quickly
losing the fight to help all of the unemployed individuals who sought
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relief from it. On January 9, 1931, it ran out of money.20 Quickly,
the emergency was getting out of hand, and developing a plan that would
work was becoming much more difficult.
A series of conferences ensued that included city officials and
other interested citizens in an effort to find some way of solving the
problems of the city's unemployed. They developed a plan in which
$10,000 would be made available to put 550 unemployed Tulsans to work
on public works projects. At that time it was believed that a make-
work project would be more beneficial than would direct assistance
through the dole. Tulsans who had been able to keep their jobs were
asked to help fund the plan by authorizing their employers to deduct a
minimum of fifty cents per week from their salaries, which would then
be matched by their companies. The money would then be used to pay the
workers three dollars per day for three days a week on a make-work
project. This low wage was agreed upon so that the program would not
compete with private industry and would help keep the "undeserving"
poor from being drawn to the offer. Additionally, the funds were to be
issued as scrip, or special credit slips, and could only be exchanged
for goods available at a special commissary.21
Ignoring complaints from labor groups and small businesses that
did not like the new system of unemployment relief, the program went
ahead. Initially, response by employers and their workers who funded
the program was good, as enough money was raised to provide for
approximately 5,000 unemployed Tulsans and their families. The mayor's
conference figured that twelve weeks should be long enough for the plan
to do some good. The biggest concern officials and citizens had was
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that migrants from other cities would come in and try to be included.
They felt that only Tulsa residents should be allowed to participate
and ordered police to drive all transients out of town, and to make all
Mexicans provide naturalization papers before they could receive jobs.
Mayor Watkins and his people were fierce in enforcing the guidelines,
as they even refused to yield to state labor officials who wanted an
end to this policy which they considered unfair for certain deserving
recipients. 22
Tulsa's insistence that it help only its own citizens continued to
bring it criticism for the rest of the winter of 1931. When Governor
William Murray ordered the establishment of state soup kitchens in the
city, opposition quickly developed. Private philanthropic agencies
maintained that the poor should be aided not in promiscuous masses at
public distributing points, but by visits to their homes. City
officials also did not approve of the plan, for their previous reason
that it would draw undesirable persons to the city to share funds
designated for the unemployed. When large numbers of families and
their children wandered into Tulsa looking for shelter, officials were
reluctant to provide them with any help, while in Oklahoma City, a
temporary village for non-resident families offered those people basic
services and a public school. Private agencies such as the Salvation
Army were left to deal with this group in Tulsa, although in certain
cases public officials did help the children. 23
When springtime came and the initial crisis had subsided, the
Mayor's Committee on Unemployment relaxed its efforts. It ended its
successful make-work program prematurely, however, and provided
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insufficient means of helping the unemployed during the summer. City
officials persisted in concluding that the bad times had ended. They
had implemented a successful plan during the winter, but a continued
effort would be necessary for future problems.
What kind of help was the Tulsa black family able to procure
during this period of hardship? Until federal agencies were
established under the New Deal, blacks were not included in service
programs, except for a very small number who received some material
relief. There were several reasons for black exclusion from the white
programs. First, the strict segregation of the races in Tulsa resulted
in a lack of understanding of common interests. The white community
did not have a conscious realization of the problems, or even the
presence of the minority group, and therefore made no provisions for
it. Second, no organizations ever existed in Tulsa to interpret the
needs of the black population to the white community, and blacks were
never employed in social welfare units until federal agencies were put
into place. Finally, the attitude of the white population acted as a
deterrent to the development of adequate social services. White
opinion seemed to be that the black person should be only a servant at
all times and that he would be a good servant only as long as he was in
economic need. Furthermore, many whites believed that blacks were
capable of performing only the most menial tasks and, therefore, could
not benefit from any type of welfare services. 24 Separated almost
completely from the white world, Tulsa's blacks had to turn to each
other for help until New Deal programs would provide some assistance
once it was established.
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While the city's minorities tried to find solutions to their
problems, its white population also had to figure out what it was going
to do about its own growing relief situation. The Family Welfare
Society, a private agency of the Community Fund, wanted to turn back
over to the county a large portion of the relief cases it had agreed to
accept during the difficult winter that had just passed. The Tulsa
County Commissioners reluctantly accepted responsibility for the care
of about 2,500 needy families and immediately attempted to drop any
cases they felt no longer warranted help. Essentially they were
adopting the city's earlier opinion that relief was not necessary
during the summer months, and so the first step they took was to drop
all 130 widows who were on the charity rolls. 25
This policy created several problems. These and many other cases,
after trying to get assistance from the county, returned to the Family
Welfare Society, which was a private social service organization. The
agency through which the county distributed its funds was a semi-public
one called the County Humane Society, and many poor recipients who had
been used to the Welfare Society's professional atmosphere now
complained to its social workers that they could no longer get help.
In response to this criticism, the Humane Society claimed that the
Welfare Society had refused to make its records available, making it
necessary for the county to perform its own investigations of worthy
recipients. The executive secretary of the social service organization
denied this accusation, explaining that her records were at the
complete disposal of county workers, adding that not one request had
been made for them. 26
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Ultimately. the county commissioners admitted that they were
unable to handle the cases that had been turned back to them. They
asked the Community Fund, the organization to which the Welfare Society
belonged, to take back the 2,500 cases that it had originally cared for
during the previous winter. The Community Fund agreed, but only if
demands of the Welfare Society were met. These demands included that
they would have control over deciding how money would be dispersed to
the unemployed and that the county had to provide a monthly budget
showing how much it would be able to contribute. A new organization,
the County Welfare Department, was created by the Community Fund to
handle the large number of charity cases. While there appeared to be a
solution, problems continued into the future over how much money the
county would be expected to contribute for its part in relieving the
poor people for whom it was financially responsible. 27
Facing problems such as this, it soon became clear to the
officials of Tulsa that a plan was necessary in order to make public
relief operate much more smoothly and efficiently. They observed that
the Community Fund, the County Humane Society, the city, and several
other separate organizations were considering many different relief
projects. They decided that it would be highly beneficial for these
activities to be supervised and coordinated in order to facilitate fund
raising and to prevent waste through duplication of effort. 28
Chamber of commerce officials established a fact-finding committee
whose purpose was to determine the best possible way to accomplish this
goal. Its members looked to see what other cities were doing, paying
particularly close attention to Oklahoma City. A program had been
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designed there by Charles C. Day, who advised the group to create one
agency responsible for clearing all relief activities by private
charities, churches, and governmental departments. The fact-finding
committee responded by issuing a questionnaire to all city agencies
doing charity work and learned that the success or failure of a relief
program in Tulsa depended on how cooperative the federal, state,
county, and city administrations were. To ensure such cooperation, it
recommended that city officials establish a Central Committee of Five
to direct and oversee county agencies and programs so that duplication
of effort could be eliminated. 29
The chamber of commerce took the advice of the fact-finding group
and established a Central Emergency Committee of Five. Noting that
this was strictly an emergency measure, the chamber's leaders explained
that in normal times, such an organization would be unnecessary,
because the several agencies for relief and social welfare would be
able to function and grow with the support of the general public. "But
when the ship runs into a storm the captain takes the bridge," its
leaders wrote, "and the crew implicitly and unquestioningly obeys until
the emergency is passed."3o
The chamber then chose the members of the committee, who included
Tulsans H.O. McClure, president of the Tulsa Industrial Finance
Corporation and representative of the chamber of commerce; Harry
Schwartz, president of the Tulsa Labor Council and a representative of
the Tulsa County Commissioners; Ernest Cornelius, president of the
Oklahoma Steel Castings Company who came from the Community Fund; Major
John Leavell, president of the Leavell Coal Company and delegate of the
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city administration; and municipal Judge G. Edward Warren, an at-large
member chosen by the other four. 31
This committee did not carryon the actual work of employment or
of charitable agencies~ but assured that there would be complete
coordination and absence of duplication of relief, either through work
or through charity. Within these guidelines, it would have complete
authority over the major groups involved - namely the county, the
Community Fund, a state-county committee, and a city committee. It
would also have access to records handled by the Social Service
Exchange and the Unemployment Registration Office. As a general rule,
charity would be confined to aged or infirm men, to women and children
without means of support, and to destitute families without adult male
members. Applicants would be expected to show that they were genuinely
in need. 32
Due to public protests, one of the initial concerns of this group
was to try to bring an end to panhandling in Tulsa. It established a
community rooming house to care for transients and set up an overnight
home for African-American men, one of the more substantial acts
designed to help blacks in the city.33 The committee then asked
Tulsa's leaders and citizens for proposals that would provide revenue
for a relief program. Several members of the community advanced their
suggestions. Michael Hale, a Tulsa hardware dealer, proposed a plan
whereby the city would layout $40,000 to purchase food at wholesale
prices. The committee would oversee distribution of the food, which
would be enough to provide for 2,500 families. It could be obtained
through the Federal Farm Board, which would help improve the condition
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of the local farmers. 34
Another idea was a "grain plan," which suggested that the city
purchase wheat from farmers in western Oklahoma, grind it into flour at
local mills, and sell it at a central commissary at a nominal price.
Tulsa cattleman Arthur F. Antle developed the "Antle Plan," in which
the city would develop a cooperative farm where unemployed men could
work to provide food for their families. Even Mayor Watkins came up
with an idea that would finance a make-work program using taxes that
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma had invalidated in 1929, because they had
been collected illegally. The sum, totalling $900,000, still had not
been returned to the citizenry, and Watkins proposed that instead of
offering a reimbursement, a portion totalling about $250,000 could be
used to hire unemployed people to construct a reservoir in Mohawk Park.
His plan seemed sensible, but it drew attack. Many people who had
invested a large sum of their own dollars to get the money back did not
want to lose this sacrifice, especially to those who had contributed
nothing but still stood to receive a refund. Also, others believed
that they should have their portion of the illegal tax returned to
them, from which they could then contribute to the poor what they could
afford. 35
The Committee of Five ultimately decided on a system of make-work
for Tulsa. Its subcommittee on make-work asked the County Excise Board
for a readjustment of the city water department's budget for permanent
improvements. By doing so, $10,000 could be raised for the work
project. The committee then decided to go ahead with a plan to have
the unemployed build an additional reservoir at Mohawk Park. They saw
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a genuine need for the reservoir, which was expected to provide a
volume of water storage sufficient to tide the city over a maximum
period of high consumption in time of drought. 36
The emergency committee also approved the provision for a
commissary, such as the one that had been operated the year before.
When possible, locally produced goods would be sold there, so that a
market would be available for producers whose sales had dropped. The
minimum stock required for a balanced diet would be carried and would
be based on a ration plan developed by committee member John Leavell,
who used the meal system eaten by his regiment in World War I as a
model. The commissary was therefore able to provide food and clothing
at the lowest possible cost. The average expense of a weekly food
ration was forty-two cents, and each meal contained 2800 calories, a
diet judged sufficient for the average unemployed worker. 37
The Tulsa commissary attracted national and international
attention, as letters were received from several states, and from as
far away as Africa, asking for information on how it worked. Leavell
was even called to Pennsylvania to describe to that state's legislature
how the program operated. In fact, the period from late 1931 to early
1932 marked the high point of relief administration in Tulsa. The
Committee of Five coordinated both private and public relief agencies,
forced county commissioners to provide public funds, and to set up a
commissary program that received broad attention. Unfortunately, all
of these accomplishments still were not enough to keep up with the
growing unemployment and economic problems. The city of Tulsa had
shown leadership and ability in helping its citizens, but could not
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find enough money to continue the program. By late spring of 1932, the
money was gone, and the Committee of Five disbanded. 38
Despite all of the problems Tulsa faced in its fight against the
depression, a report released by the research department of the city's
First National Bank and Trust Company found that in comparison with
other urban regions, Tulsa was in a better position psychologically and
economically to meet the continuing struggle brought by the poor
financial situation. The study, based chiefly on official records of
the United States Department of Commerce, provided an extensive amount
of information. It found that 42 percent of Tulsa's families owned
their own homes, a figure that was higher for that time than several
large cities, including Philadelphia, Detroit, Dallas, Chicago, and New
York. 39 It also reported that the per capita deposits in banks for
Tulsans equalled $746, a figure that was higher than St. Louis' $742,
Houston's $552, Memphis' $386, and the figure for fourteen other places
from all across the United States. 40
The investigation was full of similar statistics showing Tulsa's
relatively good standing in the areas of auto ownership, rate of
population growth, proportion of tax payers, factory payroll, and
industrial production. The city repeatedly outperformed other
metropolitan regions, such as Pittsburgh, Kansas City, Boston, San
Antonio, and Oklahoma City, in these and many other categories,
according to the analysis. Although growth had declined in recent
years, authors of the twenty-nine page study believed that,
financially, socially, and economically, Tulsa had weathered the
extended business depression quite heroically to that point. 41 This
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survey indicates that before the economic decline, Tulsa had built a
strong enough base through oil, other industries, and its general
wealth to absorb the initial brunt of the depression more
satisfactorily than other cities could.
Still, municipal officials found it necessary to seek aid from the
federal government through President Hoover's Reconstruction Finance
Corporation. The winter of 1932 was especially difficult, and by
February of that year, a central file held the names of 11,675 people
who were seeking relief. 42 With this figure continually growing,
authorities contacted the RFC in hopes of selling to that agency at
least a part of $1,300,000 worth of bonds remaining from a 1930
referendum. The regional representative of the RFC, Robert W. Kelso,
seemed uninterested, however, so Tulsa's first experience at attempting
to obtain federal help was not successful. 43
Next, city commissioners turned to the state, requesting an
allocation of $500,000 for Tulsa County from relief funds that Oklahoma
had received from the RFC. This avenue brought more positive results,
as Governor Murray made $146,000 available from the federal agency.44
Knowing that the money would have to be paid back, the Tulsa Tribune
advised that a carefully designed program should be formulated for use
of the loan, one that would provide the greatest number of work days
for the unemployed, but one that would also be of the greatest benefit
to the city and that might help pay itself off in future years. 45
This suggestion seems to have been heeded. The first make-work
project begun with RFC funds was the construction of an additional lake
in Mohawk Park, which would be available for fishing and other public
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uses. Also, a boathouse was to be built there, which would open the
new sport of boating to Tulsans. 46 Members of a management committee
pushed for the construction of a new golf course, and work on clearing
timber for it soon followed. 47 Initial funds were provided for the
employment of 250 men for forty days. Shifts would be alternated every
three days, so that each man on the job would receive a minimum of
$7.20 for three eight-hour days each week. 48
Other projects soon were approved. E.B. Howard, the governor's
representative for the RFC program in Tulsa County, announced plans for
county road work, which included forty sub-projects, timber clearing,
and grading on school property between Tulsa and nearby Bixby. Widows
and women supporting families obtained employment in a Red Cross sewing
room. 49 By November 17, more than 1,000 unemployed people, of whom
about 100 were women, had received jobs with the make-work projects.
While most of them worked at Mohawk Park, work sites were soon
scattered throughout Tulsa County.50
The RFC program helped many needy persons, especially those who
had not worked for several months. Unfortunately, it was too little,
as Hunt estimated unemployment registration for the county to be around
13,000. 51 At about the same time, the Community Fund was fighting a
losing battle to reach a goal of $548,908.60, an amount its managers
determined was necessary to finance relief and charity work adequately
during the next year. Fund leaders pleaded for aid, explaining that
they had records of 20,000 people who needed help, the great majority
of whom they claimed were sincere, law-abiding, deserving citizens. On
October 22 they had received only $225,019.71, a figure far less than
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half of the amount for which they had asked. 52 Two days later the
Community Fund ended its effort, having collected pledges totalling
$257,583.34. While they had received a significant amount of
contributions during that two day period, it still was not projected to
be nearly enough. 53 Facing the prospect of another very difficult
winter, anxious Tulsans turned again to the federal government, only
this time they sought hope from Franklin D. Roosevelt and his promise
of a New Deal.
The city's residents had 'supported Herbert Hoover in 1928, but now
saw Roosevelt as their only savior, as did much of the rest of the
country. Previously in April 1932, they had replaced George Watkins as
mayor with Herman Newblock, a Democrat who had held that office before.
Tulsa, which was located in Oklahoma's first congressional district,
had chosen Democrat Wesley Disney in 1930 to serve in Congress. He was
now running for re-election, as was Senator Elmer Thomas, a man who had
served the state either as congressman or in the senate since 1923.
These were the choices for the city in November 1932.
The Tribune reported the day before the election that Tulsa was
excitedly tense on the eve of voting day, and it predicted large
crowds, as the event was seen as a major one for the year. 54 Based on
the figures of precincts that had reported before noon on election day,
it appeared that Hoover had the edge. 55 Soon, however, it became clear
that Roosevelt would be victorious, as would Disney and Thomas.
Official returns showed 35,330 votes in Tulsa County for the new
president, a significant majority over the 25,541 who voted for Hoover.
Wesley Disney defeated his Republican opponent Frank Frantz by a vote
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of 33,867 to 22,618. Thomas defeated his opponent, Wirt Franklin, by
more than 6 t 500 votes. 56 In fact t in what the Associated Press called
a political precedent for Oklahoma, the state elected Democrats for
president, for all nine of its congressmen, and for its U.S. Senator. 57
Tulsans had made it clear that they hoped its leaders in the Democratic
party would help improve conditions.
The city of Tulsa had been founded by people who believed that
hard work and thrift were the keys to success. They had shown that
they were interested in government interference in their affairs only
when emergencies existed. It was also true, however, that when times
were as desperate as they were during the Great Depression, the city
was willing to look to other places for help. While acceptance of
funds from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was not proof that
Tulsans had given up their principles of unfettered capitalism t their
new choice for president indicates that at least in the early 1930s,
they were willing to accept government aid. Congressman Disney and
Senator Thomas had stated during their campaigns that they would stand
behind Roosevelt, and their elections further indicate Tulsans' initial
willingness to give the New Deal a chance. Due to the difficult times,
they felt they had no other choice.
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THE NEW DEAL FROM 1932-1934: WERE PROMISES
OF RELIEF THE ANSWER FOR TULSA?
In March 1933, Tuls8ns listened as Franklin Roosevelt gave his
inaugural address. The depression had made many of them tired and
unhappy, and they hoped that the new president would be able to help.
When he took office, he immediately began formulating the alphabet
programs that would be placed in action in what was known as the
"hundred days." The residents and the municipal government anticipated
the benefits that the programs might provide for the city.
Roosevelt's first action was to declare a bank holiday on March 6,
1933. Tulsans were not surprised, because five days earlier on March
1, Governor Murray had already issued a proclamation closing all of
Oklahoma's banks. l After the president made his announcement, Tulsa
business houses opened a scrip bank in order to handle payrolls and to
facilitate general commerce. Persons and businesses wishing to be
involved in the program could purchase the scrip at a cost of $101 for
each $100 worth, the extra dollar being used to pay for printing
expenses. 2 While it took a couple of days to get the program operating
smoothly, it then became quite satisfactory for those who participated
in it.
Tulsans seemed to deal with the bank holiday rather well, even
at times finding humor in their situation. The Tulsa Tribune reported
that an oil millionaire, whose home and furnishings were worth half a
million dollars, found himself with $1.20 in his pocket. Mayor
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Newblock admitted that he was better off than most; he had twelve
dollars. When asked what he would ask his congregation to put in the
Sunday plate, a Tulsa pastor chuckled and said that he would let the.
come free this Sunday.3 While the holiday did hurt some businesses,
most Tulsans seemed to find a certain amount of relief and satisfaction
in the president's proclamation.
Tulsa's citizens were able to use credit memos for groceries and
necessities, and its gas company decided not to turn off anyone's
service for non-payment until the situation was back to normal. 4 This
happened on March 14, when the city's banks reopened ahead of schedule
to busy lobbies. Bankers generally reported that the ratio of deposits
to withdrawals was about nine to one or better. By the end of the day,
deposits exceeded withdrawals by over $5,000,000, a figure that was
certainly gratifying to officials. The executive vice president of the
First National Bank said that "the reopening will have a good
psychological effect on business in general. The holiday has cleared
the atmosphere in the banking world. us
The next day, all of Tulsa county's banks reopened. Only two
faced certain restrictions, but those were only temporary precautions. 6
At the time, Tulsans strongly supported the president, giving him
credit for the favorable banking situation. The Tulsa Tribune, which
had not always supported Roosevelt before his election, announced the
return of a bristling public confidence. It believed that the American
people were now in charge, confident that the "new pilot, President
Roosevelt," would continue to steer Americans "straight up the
channel. "7
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When the new president was elected in November 1932, one of the
biggest economic problems for Tulsa, and for the entire state as well,
was the situation of the oil industry. Overproduction was the primary
reason for this, as proration statutes that had been formulated in 1915
were basically unenforceable. Also, as new fields were opening up,
producers were unwilling to limit the amount of petroleum they could
take from the ground. It soon became clear that the problem was
aggravated by the large oil producing companies, at the expense of the
smaller independents, because by depressing the price of crude, those
larger companies could eliminate competition from smaller ones. By
doing so, they would be able to form monopolies. Governor Murray had
recognized this process, and on August 4, 1931, he issued an executive
order declaring martial law, and called out the national guard to close
down 3,106 prorated oil wells in the state. 8
Early in 1933, Senator Elmer Thomas of Oklahoma called for a
senate investigation that would determine whether proration laws had
been violated in the southwest. Executives of the Champlin Oil and
Refining Company, who had already admitted their involvement in
overproduction violations, stated that major oil companies could
violate the current proration codes with impunity. They provided
copies of production reports showing that at least thirteen companies
had removed amounts of oil in excess of the allowable in Oklahoma,
thereby contributing to the current industry crisis. 9 Charles C.
Peppers, confidential agent of the Champlin group, stated that the
entire proration setup was slowly choking Oklahoma's oil wealth and
that "the so-called oil ring even goes so far as to control the
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government itself. ulo It was becoming evident that if the oil industry
was to be saved, new, enforceable laws would be necessary.
This proved to be difficult, however. Under an initial plan by
Governor Murray, his cousin, Colonel Cicero Murray, would act as an
enforcement umpire, a position he had held previously. His appointment
to this office came as a result of the wishes of special oil well
operators, a situation that brought criticism from within the Oklahoma
Senate, especially when $168,000 suspiciously appeared in his bank
account.!! The state senate finally passed a resolution that
eliminated all provisions that might give the governor power over oil
proration machinery. The bill also provided drastic penalties for
producing more oil than was allowed, for failing to make reports on
production and pipeline runs, and for making false reports.!2 Governor
Murray eventually signed this bill, which also provided for a large
enforcement group under the direction of the corporation commission,
and supported a tax to pay for it. 13
The passage of this law, however, still was not enough to cure the
oil industry. At the same time the law was being debated in Oklahoma
City, many of the nation's leading oil company executives were meeting
with Mid-Continent producers in Tulsa. There they decided that in
order for the industry to get back on its feet, the price of oil must
be increased to one dollar per barrel, approximately seventy cents
higher than it was at that time. For this to happen, supply could no
longer be greater than demand, which they figured to be at about
2,000,000 barrels per day nationally. At the time of their meeting in
March 1933, supply was at 4,000,000 barrels per day, or approximately
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twice what was needed. To get this figure down to an acceptable level,
each oil producing state would have to agree to a maximu. amount of
prorated oil production, and then to comply with that figure. While
some of the officials supported this discussion, others, such as Tulsa
oil man Harry Sinclair, were more pessimistic, believing that
compliance and enforcement would be difficult. 14
The answer, they decided, was to turn to the federal government
and Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes. In late March, three
committees representing the governors of the oil producing states, the
oil and gas associations representing independent producers of oil and
gas in the United States, and the major oil and gas producing and
importing companies met together and recommended to Ickes a program
that they thought would meet the existing emergency in the oil
industry. Their program provided many specific recommendations,
including giving President Roosevelt the power to force governors of
oil states to close flush pools within their states, to make them adopt
conservancy statutes if they did not already have them, and to have
Congress pass a law prohibiting the transportation of oil in interstate
and foreign commerce. IS
The group also wanted the president and the national government to
impose competitive tariffs on foreign oil, to delay drilling on public
lands, and to force producing states to limit production of crude oil
to the requirements of market demand. They introduced the decision
arrived at in the Tulsa conference, whereby national output would be
limited to 2,000,000 barrels per daYt of which Oklahoma would be
allowed 417,690. The representatives of these committees then provided
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results of the vote for endorsement of this proposal. Seventeen of the
twenty independent and corporate petroleua associations, including
those from Oklahoma, voted in favor of this proposal for national
regulation. 16
President Roosevelt supported the proposal, stating that
"Government ought to have the right • • • after surveying and planning
for an industry to prevent, with the assistance of the overwhelming
majority of that industry, unfair practice, and to enforce this
agreement by the authority of government."l? He decided, however, not
to include many of the provisions of the proposal in his national
recovery-public works bill in June. Continued enforcement problems and
inconsistencies in the federal government's actions with regard to the
oil industry meant that a solution would still be difficult to find.
Roosevelt was less cautious in his attempts to provide help for
the unemployed and their families who were suffering due to the
depression. One of the first relief agencies he created was the
Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), which called for
$500,000,000 for federal grants to states. He appointed Harry Hopkins,
who had run a siailar agency for the president during his term as
governor of New York, as its administrator. During its early period in
existence, many Oklahomans, especially those in counties such as Tulsa,
profited little from the FERA because its funds for the state were
controlled by Governor Murray. He was able to obstruct the manner in
which the money was distributed, and this hurt regions that he
considered unfriendly. is Still, Tulsa was able to obtain approximately
$680,000 froa the FERA, as well as from other public state and local
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funds, from July to December 1933. 19
Realizing that the inability to create new jobs was impeding
econo.ic recovery, Hopkins and his assistant, Aubrey Williams. decided
to implement a temporary program through the fall and winter of 1933-
1934, which would employ about four million jobless people for that
period. Known as the Civil Works Administration (CWA) , the program
worked alongside the FERA, and was to exist until the more extensive
Works Progress Administration (WPA) could begin operation the next
spring. 2o Due to the problems that the FERA administration was having
with Governor Murray and his handling of relief funds, Hopkins decided
to name another individual, Carl Giles of Norman, to head the CWA for
the state. 21 This made Oklahoma's civil works administrative system
rather unusual, because in most states, governors oversaw the regular
federal relief organizations and would also be in control of this newer
one. One thing that Hopkins had insisted on was that politics would
not be a factor in CWA dealings, and Giles guaranteed that there would
be no politics in his organization.
The program came to Tulsa in mid-November, producing a mixture of
benefit and confusion. Initially, the city was excited about having
the chance to put a large number of its unemployed to work at the
expense of the federal government. Jobless people were to receive jobs
as quickly as possible, and arrangements were made to transfer several
thousand men and women from Governor Murray's federal relief
administration payroll to the new civil works set-up. Giles appointed
W.H. Elliot as Tulsa County CWA administrator, and his job was to
implement the program according to the rules set down by the federal
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government.
Because Roosevelt had ordered that half of the workers would co.e
from the u.s. Unemployment Office and the other half from the federal
relief administration payroll, Elliot decided that until new CWA
projects were devised, those workers already on make-work projects in
Tulsa would continue on them. They would begin receiving the new CWA
wages, which were forty cents per hour for unskilled labor and one
dollar an hour for skilled labor, for a total of thirty hours per week.
Previously under the original make-work programs, workers could only
make $10.80 each month, so the new wages were significantly higher. 22
Problems began after Hopkins told CWA administrators to get as
many people employed under the program as quickly as possible. Elliot
had already transferred around 8,000 men who had been on the make-work
payroll to the CWA payroll, under the assumption that there would be
plenty of money for Tulsa County to pay them. At the same time, he had
registered several thousand self-sustaining unemployed on the CWA
rolls, so that he would be in compliance with the rule requiring that
the total number of men receiving jobs was to be divided equally
between those previously on make-work jobs and those considered self-
sustaining unemployed. It had been estimated that the number of people
in this latter group could reach 10,000 men and women. 23
Tulsa officials then learned the news that the total amount
allotted to the county was $895,000, a figure that would employ
approximately half of those who were expected to register. Elliot
quickly suspended the work that had already been going on in order to
try to deal with this situation. To reduce the number of people who
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had already signed up, he ordered that only those who could provide
their own transportation could get work and that only able-bodied men
should receive employ.ent, while all others should go to the federal-
state relief office to get help. Having determined that some people
had actually quit their real jobs believing that they could get higher
wages with the CWA, Elliot ordered that those who had done so would be
denied work. Also, only the breadwinner of the family should register,
as he found that in some instances entire families were signing up.24
This did not solve the problems, however, especially when Elliot
and other officials learned that no more than 5,900 people were to be
given CWA jobs. 25 He had already allowed 8,000 of the old make-work
employees to keep those jobs under the CWA, a figure that exceeded the
limit by 2,100. Compounding this situation was the fact that one-half
of the 5,900 had to come from the rolls of the self-sustaining
unemployed, who had continually been signing up. Elliot immediately
removed 2,100 aged and disabled men who had been part of the make-work
crews and told them that they should go to the Community Fund building
for assistance. Many formed an angry crowd, however, shouting threats
and causing problems that led the police to detain four of them. 26
The situation continued to deteriorate. By the third week of the
existence of the CWA in Tulsa, approximately 14,000 Tulsans who needed
jobs could not get any because of the 5,900-person limit. Of these, a
large group were World War I veterans, who were supposed to have a
first chance at CWA employment but did not, because Elliot had already
given all of the jobs to the make-workers. There was also a group
composed of the "self-sustaining" unemployed who were mandated by
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Roosevelt to get one half of the available jobs but did not for the
same reason as the veterans. A third group was made up of about 2,500
women, none of whom had received a job as yet with the CWA, even though
a certain number of them were supposed to. 27 A fourth group would
immediately follow and was composed of able-bodied .en who had been
receiving aid from the FERA, but were eliminated from its lists on
December 11 in order to make room for the veterans, aged, and disabled
men who could not get jobs with the CWA.28 This was clearly a low
point for relief administration for Tulsa.
Soon, however, action was taken to improve these conditions. R.L.
Webb, manager of the federal-state CWA office, began investigating the
names on the aake-work list of workers, in a rather successful effort
to remove as many as possible who did not meet stern eligibility tests.
Also, the FERA opened sewing rooms, which employed 1,000 women by
December 19. 29 Gradually, more men from the list of self-sustaining
unemployed were able to obtain work with the CWA. This was because the
Tulsa organization was allowing a number of jobs i.n excess of the 5,900
with which it had been provided by the state office. By the end of
1933, a total of 6,850 people were working daily at a payroll of
$81,000 dollars per week. 30 They worked on many different jobs,
including a reservoir at Mohawk Park, scattered county school jobs,
street car railway removals, paving repairs, and drainage ditches.
Additionally, 1,350 women had jobs in sewing rooms under the FERA, 350
of whom were blacks working on the north side of town. 31
The new year brought both good and bad news. The CWA job quota
had increased to 7,500 for Tulsa County, but no aore FERA funds were
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available for sewing rooms. 32 The year also brought a new county
administrator, as W.H. Elliot was replaced with Stoner McLelland, who
had previously been check distribution officer. Giles made the change
for reasons of insubordination by Elliot, who did not want to follow a
national policy geared toward substantial building, but rather one that
emphasized make-work projects. McLelland, who was known as a builder,
quickly organized the county's program along military lines, so that it
might run more efficiently.33
Near the end of January, the CWA in Tulsa began winding down, in
preparation for the new WPA program that was to begin that spring. On
January 25, its quota was reduced to 7,091, with the great majority of
the reductions occurring among black workers. 34 New projects continued
to be approved, but the number of layoffs increased as well. One month
later, the number of workers was reduced to 5,875. 35 Gradually this
amount diminished, until the CWA program disappeared from Tulsa on
March 30. By its end, forty-three jobs had been completed, including
some major ones such as the reservoir at Mohawk Park, a city hall
renovation project, and work on the Petroleum Exposition buildings at
the fairgrounds. Since the start of the CWA in November 1933,
estimates showed that Tulsa County had received a total of $1,500,000,
of which $1,250,000 went to provide jobs for the unemployed. 36 After a
rough start, the CWA made an impact on Tulsa in its short period of
existence.
When the CWA ended in March, most of its operations were taken
over by the Federal Emergency Relief Administration. Although the FERA
had been in existence since May 1933, the majority of its work in
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Oklahoma until now had been carried by the CWA. By late winter 1934,
tensions between Hopkins and Murray had risen so high that the federal
administrator felt compelled to place all FERA funds in the hands of
state administrator Giles, who had already controlled those designated
for the CWA.37
The FERA accomplished a significant amount of work in Tulsa from
March of 1934 until its end in 1935, although the funds available were
not what they had been under the CWA. During the four months it
existed, it had provided for Tulsa approximately $1,500,000, while the
FERA would contribute around $1,000,000 from April to December of 1934
for the county.38 Initially, it put men back to work on jobs that were
not completed under the CWA, such as on a minor league baseball park
and on a fire station. Under new regulations, only the persons
destitute from unemployment and who had at least three dependents would
be given work relief. The local co••unity was supposed to take care of
disabled persons, and state sources, which were still controlled by
Murray, were also expected to be available. Pay initially ranged from
$7.75 to $40 per week, according to the budget needs of the worker's
household. 39
W.C. Weir replaced McLelland as county FERA administrator after
McLelland, who had been in charge since the CWA closed, resigned in
April. One of Weir's first duties under state administrator Giles was
to post notices in relief headquarters, ordering that every employee
keep free froa any "taint or suspicion" of political activity. County
officials were instructed to report immediately any co.plaints
pertaining to political coercion or suspicion of unfair tactics
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indulged in by any political subdivision of government, so far as the
relief program was concerned. The penalty for such activities was
immediate dismissal from work. 4o While certain corrupt actions
probably still occurred anyway, it was clear that open political
influences did not exist in Tulsa, as they did in many other American
cities.
The FERA provided funds for .any worthwhile jobs for the city. In
June approximately $3,000 was set aside to rehabilitate the health of
100 malnourished Tulsa children. 41 Another summer project was a city-
wide program of supervised recreation in the public parks. While it
only employed 36 women, this program served thousands of adults and
young people. 42 There were also provisions for .ore traditional FERA
projects, such as building roads, bridges, and drainage ditches. In
late July, the Tulsa county FERA reached a peak in food distribution,
having given out nearly a half of a million pounds of flour, lard,
pork, and cereals in only three and one-half months. 43
Other more substantial projects received funding as well. FERA
workers built a small airport in Tulsa at a total cost of $7,343,
$6,084 of which went towards payroll costs. 44 The first of seven meat
canning operations in Oklahoma was opened in Tulsa in August 1934.
From then until December, 11,575 men and 4,484 women filled 1,925,660
cans with beef, and earned a total of $163,151. The Tulsa factory was
the most productive of the seven in the state. 45 The city's visiting
housekeeper plan, which even caught the attention of President
Roosevelt, provided jobs for wo.en to look after and assist Tulsats
elderly population. When speaking to a group in another location, the
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president referred to it, saying, "The women of Tulsa, through the
visiting housekeepers, are actually reaching the people who are in need
and teaching them how to utilize the materials they have in their
homes. These are the people the govern.ent is actually trying to do
something for."46
In September, Harry Hopkins called on fourteen states, one of
which was Oklahoma, to share an increased portion of the charity
burden. Officials in Tulsa decided to place a question before the
people calling for the passage of a $100,000 bond issue, which would be
used to contribute to federal funds designed for charity.47 This
brought an opportunity to determine whether Tulsans were prepared to
help in the relief effort, or whether they were content to rely solely
on federal funds for assistance. The issue was divided into two
separate votes, one of which called for $25,000 and the second for
$75,000. On the first, the vote was 10,375 to 8,797 in favor, while
the larger sum passed by a vote of 9,871 to 8,657. 48 While the results
were close, the vote showed that Tulsans were willing to contribute to
the New Deal, at least early in its existence.
The FERA in Tulsa accomplished many things in 1934. It gave help
to many people and families who needed it. At the same time, it faced
limits as well. Carl Giles explained that, according to the way
budgets were set, a laborer might only be able to work from two to five
days per month, depending on his need and his level of skill. This did
not allow him to reach his maximum efficiency or to acquire a
familiarity or an interest in the work he was doing. 49 Also, as has
been mentioned, the total funds available to Tulsa were not enough to
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provide truly adequate relief. The state government was supposed to
contribute to each county, but in Oklahoma this meant dealing with
Governor Murray. He only gave money to counties that were of political
benefit to him. Since there was open animosity between Murray and the
people of Tulsa, the city was left with nothing. Local funds donated
in the amount of almost $287,000 did help, but because of the nature of
the depression in 1934, more was needed. 50
Following the implementation of the FERA, Roosevelt's next step
was to try to stimulate t:1e economy by attempting to forge a new,
positive relationship between government and business. His plan for
this relationship was developed as the National Industrial Recovery
Act, which Congress passed on May 14, 1933. Title I of this act
suspended antitrust laws so that industrial codes regulating
production, prices, and trade practices could operate. It also
included a section guaranteeing labor representation in the workplace,
as well as collective bargaining. Title II included provisions for
allocating 3.3 billion dollars for the Public Works Administration,
which would also help the economy and unemployment by creating
resources for large public building projects. S1 President Roosevelt
placed responsibility for Title I with Oklahoman Hugh Johnson, who
wanted to establish a partnership among industry, retailers, and the
public by instituting minimum wages and hours for labor, while at the
same time convincing the public to do business only with those
retailers who conformed to the program. While the NRA proved
ultimately to be a failure, Tulsans were quite enthusiastic about it
early in its existence.
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The blue eagle emblem was the sy_bol of compliance with the NRA
codes, and when they arrived at the Tulsa post office on July 29,
seventy employers signed up for theirs within the first two hours.
Larger businesses that did so included the Tulsa County Druggists
Association, which included 200 members, as well as sixty furniture
dealers, representing about thirty stores. People who represented very
large trade associations, such as restaurant employees, barbers and
beauty operators, and tire dealers, quickly organized meetings and
attempted to devise ways in which their groups could devise wage and
hour schedules that would comply with the act. 52
Tulsans continued to show their enthusiasm for the NRA. By early
August, the city led Oklahoma in voluntary observance of the blue eagle
standard of higher wages, shorter hours, and increased employment.
This standing was based on 2,328 pledges, affecting 20,525 workers,
which exceeded Oklahoma City's figures of 1,837 pledges affecting
13,729 employees. 53 These results came amid the first charges of abuse
of the NRA codes in Tulsa, as six firms that had signed compliance
agreements were accused of violating wage and hour provisions.
Officials regarded these accusations as questionable, however, because
they had been made by discharged employees. 54
In an effort to make consumers aware of what the NRA was supposed
to do for them, General Johnson instituted a "Buy Now" plan in order to
get people into the stores. A reporter went to Froug's, a large Tulsa
department store, to find out how it was working. Manager M.E. Froug
said that ttThis is by far the best business day we have had in many
months. The store has been full all day. [People are] not just
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looking, but buying."55
Although continual problems existed in the oil industry nationally
over forming a wage and hour code, many Tulsans involved in this
business claimed that the NRA was of great benefit. While the matter
of settling the oil code was of some concern, owners of one related
Tulsa business stated that they had still been able to hire thirty new
employees. At an oil well supply firm, when a reporter asked an
employee for concrete evidence that the NRA was working, he replied, "I
am the evidence. This is my second day. I was laid off for two and
one-half years."56
While these were positive stories, there were also other people
who were not satisfied. The president of a Tulsa food supply company
stated that the NRA was the worst thing that had ever happened. He had
taken on twenty-two new employees and increased his payrolls $1,200 per
month, but costs for his supplies had gone up, while the price of his
product had decreased. He complained that his company was nowhere big
enough to dictate prices. 57 In fact, this problem was shared by many
smaller businessmen who tried to comply fully with the codes, but were
in danger of failing while they waited for fulfillment of promises that
the economy was going to improve. 58
Overall, the NRA continued to receive support. The chamber of
commerce, decided to stage a special celebration for it which would
include a parade. 59 They invited Hugh Johnson's mother, an Oklahoma
resident, to be parade leader and speaker. 6o After it ended the Tulsa
Tribune called it a "pageant of progress" and predicted that prosperity
was just around the corner. The newspaper estimated that 100,000
58
people attended, there to see Mrs. Johnson, "mother of . the
nation's No. 2 lIan."61 Later in November, General Johnson came to
Tulsa, where he gave examples of what the NRA had done for Oklahoma. 52
At the end of 1933 enthusiasm for the NRA began to subside, as
some of its inherent problems began to surface. Namely, there was
agitation within labor. While reports are not as extensive as they
were for cities such as Baltimore, labor unrest did occur. Initially
it was minor, such as when the Oklahoma State Federation of Labor
issued a protest to Johnson over wages for mine workers. 53 Then in
December 1933, angry bUB drivers voted to go on strike. They were
upset because while their pay remained the same, their hours were
drastically cut from 70 to 48 per week. Because of this, 140 of them
walked off the job. 54
Other people complained because prices did not increase as they
were supposed to. By the middle of June, criticism was leveled at
General Johnson, because of his bullying attitude, and because he had
succeeded not in joining labor and industry together but in dividing
them. Tribune editors proposed that a limited number of master codes
be substituted for the hundreds of rules and regulations, "worked out
by General Johnson and his codemakers for control of all the petty
details of American business."6s These responses are similar to those
found throughout the nation. 66 It appeared that the NRA might not be
the answer to Tulsa's economic recovery, although like many other New
Deal programs, it did provide some relief.
The National Industrial Recovery Act also included a section
designated as "Title II: Public Works and Construction Projects."
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Headed by Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, it appropriated 3.3
billion dollars for the Public Works Adainistration. 67 Its purpose was
to spend this money, either as direct grants or on a basis of
percentage contributions to states and municipal localities, in order
to put unemployed people to work on small and large construction
projects. The PWA was hampered by Ickes's caution in distributing the
funds, which, when combined with the "offensive" nature of Oklahoma's
state politics, meant that Tulsans could not plan from benefiting from
it very much. Out of all of the New Deal programs formulated during
Roosevelt's first one hundred days, the PWA had the least to offer
Tulsa during the period lasting until the end of 1934. After that,
tireless campaigning by Congressman Disney and Senator Thomas offered
Tulsa and its surrounding region hope for major flood control and power
projects. Even then, however, positive results were achieved slowly.
Initial reports, however, were quite hopeful that the state would
benefit from the PWA. When its creation was announced, leaders figured
that the state's share of the 3.3 billion dollar appropriation would be
from 25 to 40 million dollars. Plans for flood control and power
plants on the Arkansas and Red Rivers had already been discussed, and
officials determined that 15 to 30 million dollars could be set aside
for them. The other 10 million dollars would be ~sed for road and
highway construction. 68 The Arkansas River project would have been of
significant benefit for Tulsa and northeastern Oklahoma, because it
would solve serious flooding problems for the region, as well as put
thousands of unemployed people to work. Tulsa's officials went to work
i..ediately trying to develop a plan that would be acceptable to the
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PWA.69 At the same time, county commissioners submitted twelve highway
and bridge projects for construction. 7o
By September 1933, however, the state had only received $9,216,798
of the $3.3 billion available t all of which was to be used for roads.
One reason for this was because state statutes and constitutional
restrictions made it difficult for cities, counties, school districts,
and the state itself to contract debts with which to match federal
public works funds, and officials did not seem willing to overstep
these provisions. Murray was blamed for making it difficult to borrow
money that could be used to match the funds. He also balked at
suggestions by lawyers to have the government build public structures,
let the cities lease them, and then pay for them out of city taxes,
making it needless for them to issue bonds. Murray referred to this
plan as an "evasion of the constitution."71
Meanwhile, committees were being formed and plans were being laid
out for possible river projects throughout the state. The center for
the Arkansas flood control project was located in Tulsa. As its
members submitted proposals to Washington and received no response,
Senator Thomas voiced his disgust. In what he termed "dilly-dallying"
by the Public Works Administration in allocating the funds, he
threatened that Congress would take over the job of disbursing them.
Referring to the various dam projects for his state, Thomas said, "If
we don't get action by the tiae Congress convenes, we are going to
Congress with the projects and I believe we will get action."72 A
subsequent study showed that while $365,512,808 had been set aside
nationally by November for flood control, Oklahoma had received none. 73
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In Tulsa, the first significant PWA appropriation did not coae
until January 1934. The city received $47,000 for the widening of the
West Eleventh street bridge, which crossed the Arkansas River. The
a.ount represented the government's 30 percent donation to the project;
the city would provide the remaining 70 percent fro. city bonds. Tulsa
officials had forwarded applications for PWA grants totalling 1.3
million dollars, which would have been used for other streets, bridges,
and high schools, but they had received little consideration. The
state highway commission had received some blame for using politics in
dispensing the money, but Tulsa was also hurt due to its inability to
raise more .atching funds because of its high level of outstanding debt
warrants. 74
For whatever reasons they were not receiving any money, Tulsans
were still displeased. By November 1934, approximately $2.4 million
had actually been sent to Oklahoma by the PWA.75 Tulsa still had. only
one grant for $47,000, which helped employ 150 men to help widen the
bridge. The Tulsa Tribune figured that had the funds been distributed
according to population, the city should have received $4.4 million of
the entire $3.3 billion the PWA had. 76 City residents did not
understand why they were being excluded.
As for the river projects, plans had been submitted and
resubmitted to Washington, sometimes receiving the attention of the
president, but usually simply dying or being vetoed by some
congressional coamittee. Efforts by Senator Thomas, Congressman
Disney, and the Arkansas Basin Commission, headquartered in Tulsa,
continued anyway. Finally, in late Deceaber 1934, the United States
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Army Engineering Corps approved a $34 million plan for the Arkansas
Valley; it included plans for a navigable channel from the Mississippi
River to Tulsa, five irrigation projects, and the construction of
levees froa the aouth of the Arkansas to Tulsa, and along the Grand and
Illinois Rivers. Approval by the army engineers was a significant
step, but the ultimate decision would still be left up to congress and
the president. 77
While other New Deal programs had been useful to Tulsa by the end
of 1934, the PWA had not. Project approvals of every type encountered
problems due to the city's inability to provide matching funds, the
state government's refusal to help. The city was supported by the
strong efforts of Thomas and Disney in Congress, who at that time were
both ardent New Dealers. For immediate relief, however, Tulsa would
have to look somewhere other than the PWA.
Realizing that the depression was difficult for home owners,
Roosevelt sent legislation to Congress that addressed the problem of
home mortgage foreclosures. The result was the Home Owners Loan
Corporation, which would refinance these mortgages by establishing the
federal government as a second source of credit. 78 Tulsans would have
three chances to obtain aid from this program. They could persuade
whoever held their mortgage to exchange it for HOLe bonds, whose
maximum interest rate of 4 percent would be guaranteed by the
government. They could also appeal for a cash loan from the HOLe,
which would be limited to 50 percent of the appraised value of their
property. Or. if ho.eowners were unable to take either of these
options, they could take a cash advance not to exceed 40 percent of the
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value of their property and repay it with interest at 6 percent. 79
Tulsa was successful in a battle with Oklahoma City over which city was
to be the location for the HOLe state offices, essentially because
Disney, who supported the Tulsa center, was able to outlast Senator
Gore, the capital's sponsor, in a tough fight. sO This office handled
the majority of eastern Oklahoma's mortgage refinancing until the
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was established in 1934.
One way to measure the impact of Roosevelt and the New Deal on
Tulsa is by looking at the results of the city and state elections of
1934. The race for mayor and other municipal posts were held in April,
with state and congressional primaries in early June and their runoffs
in November. By examining their outcomes, it is possible to determine
more clearly how important Tulsans considered the president's policies
to be.
One of the first developments in the mayoral elections occurred in
the fall of 1933, when incumbent Herman Newblock announced that he
would not be running to retain the office. Having served a total of
four terms as mayor, plus several other local posts, he would
eventually decide to run for congressman of the first district against
Wesley Disney.81 The Democratic nomination for the office of mayor was
taken by prominent druggist Dr. T.A. Penny. He was joined by
Democratic candidates running for positions of fire and police,
finance, street, water commissioners, and auditor. Republican John M.
Goldsberry opposed him and also supported a slate of Republican
candidates for commissioners. 82
Penny promised to bring as much of the New Deal as he could to
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Tulsa, and this pledge helped him to victory in the election. 83 The
city's other Democrats were also successful, and Tulsa's "New Deal"
administration was installed in office on May 7, 1934. At that time,
the mayor repeated his campaign pledge that his group was interested in
bringing to the city new development and programs in line with the
thought of the national administration. 84 Tulsa, which never had
developed definable political voting trends, elected a mayor who did
have important local goals, but who also was a follower of the popular
national agenda.
There were several Democratic candidates for governor who figured
they had a good chance of winning the primary and getting into the
general election. They included Tom Anglin, who was Murray's choice to
replace him as governor; J. Berry King, an attorney and fierce anti-
Murrayitej E.W. Marland, a Ponca City oil man who had previously
served as U.S. Congressman; and Jack Walton, who had been Oklahoma's
governor in the 1920s but had been impeached. Other hopefuls included
Cyrus Avery, Tulsa Chamber of Commerce president, and R.L. Davidson, a
former state senator. On the Republican side, William Pine was the
most likely nominee, but at that time, the consensus was that the
Democrats had the best chance of winning, and that race received the
most attention. 8s
The majority of Tulsans threw their support behind King, mainly
for two reasons. First, King received the support of the city's oil
men, who felt he had promised the most support for their industry.
They openly attacked Murray and his candidate, because they blamed the
governor's political tactics for the problems their business was
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facing. In fact, this leads to the second reason most of the city's
people supported King. There was a true hatred for Murray in Tulsa,
and its people found promise in King, whose attacks on Anglin. the
governor's candidate, were relentless. This case also provides an
example of how politics in Oklahoma in general tended to be based on
personalities, rather than on substance. 86 King faced problems,
however, in raising campaign funds, and in June, a close race was
expected between him and Walton for the second primary opening. Anglin
was predicted to get the first opening. 8?
The principal primary candidates for the first congressional
district, which included Tulsa, were incumbent Wesley Disney and former
mayor Herman Newblock. Disney was a Roosevelt supporter who had worked
very hard to get as much New Deal support for Oklahoma as he could.
His main focus had been getting approval for PWA projects, specifically
one for Arkansas River flood control and another huge one for a power
plant on the Grand River. 88 Disney was opposed by Newblock, who had
the support of the utility interests, who were heavily against plans
for a Grand River power authority.89
Many Oklahomans were surprised when E.W. Marland emerged
victoriously from the primaries. He had run on a platform that was
almost exclusively related to the New Deal. It had outlined a 14-point
"New Deal for Oklahoma,lt which sought many of the same aims for the
state as Roosevelt's did for the country. These aims included setting
up committees that would address Oklahoma's agricultural and industrial
problems, and planning for a meeting between Marland and the president
in order to push demands for an expenditure of $30,000,000 or more on
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public works for the state, which would take the unemployed off charity
rolls. 9o
Marland received almost 157,000 votes, beating second place
Anglin, who received approximately 101,000. 91 Although he had earned a
spot in the general election, Anglin decided he could not win and
withdrew, leaving victorious Republican William Pine as Marland's last
challenge. In Tulsa, hatred for Murray and fear of an Anglin victory
led voters to support King with 14,083 votes, placing Marland next with
4,999. Realizing what Disney had been doing for them in Washington,
Tulsans chose him overwhelmingly over their own four-term mayor by a
count of 14,238 to 2,664. Calling it one of the hardest elections they
had ever worked, Tulsa County tabulators labored for 51 hours, counting
a record 31,576 votes. 92
Although Pine campaigned hard for the governor's seat, Marland
defeated him in the general election quite handily. In fact, in an
election that provided Roosevelt the most thorough party support in
history, not only did Oklahoma elect a full Democratic slate to
Congress, but Tulsa also chose an all-Democratic county commission for
the first time ever. 93 Having removed the threat of Murray in the
primary, Tulsans threw their support behind Marland in the general
election, giving him 5,000 more votes than Pine. They also helped
Disney defeat his opponent, Republican Robert Kellough, by a vote of
24,742 to 13,737. 94 This Democratic rout by Tulsans is evidence that
two years into his presidency, Roosevelt had managed to retain the
popularity he had in 1932.
What did all of this New Deal activity ultimately mean for Tulsans
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during its first two years? Did it mean economic recovery? What did
the city's residents think about President Roosevelt and his programs?
Overall, the results for Tulsa were mixed. A return to pre-depression
prosperity clearly did not happen, as .oat economic indicators showed
that recovery would be slow and difficult. At the saae time, certain
bright spots did exist, and it appeared that Tulsans were willing to
keep trying.
The year 1933 was truly difficult for the city, and it ended up
being the worst twelve months of the entire depression. Along with
trying to deal with relieving the unemployed, city officials found it
nearly impossible to find the finances with which to run everyday
municipal operations. In March, 12 of the 27 departments of the city
government under the general fund faced shortages in their budgets.
This was not because they had overspent, but because anticipated
revenues fell short, making it impossible to pay expenses. 9S To deal
with the problem, officials were forced t dismiss city employees to
make up the difference. 96 By May, with only two months left in the
fiscal year, revenue-collecting problems meant that the city had spent
$485,457 more than it had received. The deficit was so high that when
asked to cash city warrants to provide necessary funds, Tulsa bankers
refused, feeling that to do so would have been too risky.97
Departments had no choice but to continue dismissing employees and to
delay the issuance of payroll checks to others.
To prepare for similar problems that might come for the next
fiscal year, which began on July 1, the city commission trimmed almost
$163,000 from what the city budget had been the previous year, or about
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9.3 percent. 9S By September, however, it became clear that this still
would not be nearly enough, as the county excise board indicated that a
substantial 20 to 25 percent additional cut would be necessary.99 As
commissioners and department heads scrambled in search of ways to make
the cuts, Tulsa County found itself defaulting on bond payments for the
first time in its history.lOO
Tulsa was compelled to take drastic action to rectify the problem.
The city chose to dismiss 40 additional employees in December, with at
least 36 more to follow. Municipal leaders also decided to close
various white and negro hospitals and charity health clinics, meaning
the additional release of all their employees. They even chose to
close the city hall elevators, eliminating their operators and other
building superintendents. Free events at the convention center were
also eliminated, which had drawn a total of 230,500 people the previous
year. lOl These were very serious problems, and they compounded the
unemployment and negative growth situations in ways that the New Deal
could not begin to erase.
There were other bad signs as well. Tulsa's bank statistics had
also reached what would be a decade low. Total debits were at
$811,309,083 and bank resources equalled $81,926,868, down from just
over $120 million in 1931. Total bank clearings were $205,959,208,
which was 18 percent less than what it had been the year before t and
significantly below the 1929 amount of $636,799,097. 102 Net sales for
all retail distribution decreased from $91,653 t 671 to $44,690,000.
Payroll for this segment of the economy declined from $12,394,802 to
6,057,000, or approximately half. Its effect on employment patterns
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can also be seen as part-time payroll indicates. Total wages for this
kind of employment was $121,239 in 1929, but in 1933, it was $415,000,
which illustrates how many people were forced to accept part-time,
rather than full-time jobs during the difficult depression period. 103
The number of people on relief reached a high point in October
1933. In Tulsa County the figure for this group was 19,180. 104 Of
these, 17,658 lived in the city proper and accounted for 5,283
families. While whites accounted for 12,306 individuals, the other
5,252 were black, or roughly 30 percent of the total. lOS Census
information for Tulsa in 1930 lists a total population of 141,258,
which included 123,896 whites and 15,203 blacks. I06 While these
numbers would not have been exact for 1933, they are still useful in
determining the percentage of the total population on relief for that
year. They show that in October, 12.5 percent of all city residents
were on relief. Of these, 9.9 percent of the white population was on
relief, while a significant 34.5 percent of the black population was as
well. These numbers do indicate that, aside from all the revenue
problems Tulsa was facing, its problem with people on relief was not so
bad, especially because other cities had one-fourth of their people or
more in the same situation. The problem for blacks was severe,
however, as its percentage of relief families was consistently higher
than those of whites.
In 1934 the situation seems to have improved. Total bank
clearings increased to $263,879,708, higher than they had been since
1931. 107 The number of building permits increased to 970,975, an
encouraging 456,893 more than the previous year. lOS Property
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assessments also increased over the previous year low, but only by
about 1 percent. 109 The city budget for the 1934-35 fiscal year still
included many reductions, but was more stable, and commissioners
anticipated revenue increases. I10 Jobs had been found for 5,567
through public works and private employment, and business and
industrial expansion led to high hopes for 1935. 111
What was the New Deal's impact on all of this activity? Its
specific programs varied in impact from very little to an important
amount. Tulsa had received $1,500,000 from the CWA and then close to
$1,000,000 from the FERA. Funds gained from the PWA were
disappointingly low. Through the HOLe state office in Tulsa, people
began applying for mortgage refinancing in the thousands by the end of
1934. The NRA had helped somewhat but began receiving criticism by the
end of that same year. Although Tulsans then might not have realized
it, the application of New Deal policies was somewhat more conservative
than the president had initially indicated they would be. While
providing some relief, certainly much more would be necessary to return
the city to its pre-depression prosperity.
At the same time, Roosevelt and the New Deal did have a more
positive effect. Tulsans had shown repeatedly that they
enthusiastically supported him and many of his programs. They had
shown this through their response t particularly to the early NRA and to
the FERA. They also believed that a large part of the reason they did
not share as equitably in the relief measures was due to an
antagonistic state government, which they voted to remove.
The New Deal never received unquestioning support; indeed t
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criticism was heard for each program. But this did not keep Tulsans
from going to the polls and overwhelmingly electing Democratic
municipal, state, and national office holders. Lopsided elections for
Disney and Marland represented support for Roosevelt and his ideas,
because the individuals Tulsans chose made promises that mirrored the
president's own. In a New York Times/Literary Digest poll held in
June 1934, which measured approval of the president and his program,
the results for Tulsa were 263 for and 101 against. 112 Tulsans were
willing to allow federal government involvement in their business,
something that would continue even after the New Deal period had ended.
While there was not a significant economic improvement, Tulsans
continued to support the president and the New Deal. because he had
tried, and achieved some success, at easing the difficult depression
situation.
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THE NEW DEAL FROM 1935-1938: MODEST ACCOMPLISHMENTS
MEET GROWING DISPLEASURE
In 1935 the national administration began new programs that would
become known as the Second New Deal. They included a public works
program that would operate as the Works Progress Administration (WPA).
The president ended the FERA, which had benefited Tulsans with a total
of $2,951,601 during the period it had existed. l In 1935 the Supreme
Court also declared the NRA unconstitutional, leaving the president to
find a new way for business, government, and labor to operate. Tulsans
looked for continued benefits from these ideas for the oil industry,
and for their own relief from agencies such as the WPA, the PWA, and
others that would be created. They found, however, that there would
not be much help for them. During the period from 1935 to 1938,
discouragement and resentment toward Washington D.C. grew among
Tulsans, leaving many to look for other ways to improve their
situation.
The condition of the oil industry in Tulsa, and for the entire
state as well, improved little during the second half of the 1930s.
With the declaration of the NRA's unconstitutionality in 1935,
producers were left to try to work among themselves to fix the existing
problems. While most oil corporations, independents, and the
government agreed that overproduction continued to keep price levels
too low, very rarely were they in agreement over what the solution was.
Many, including Congressman Disney, believed that self regulation
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through compacts was the answer, but it was difficult to get everyone
to conform. Even when agreeaents were reached within Oklahoma, other
states would refuse to participate, making the pacts meaningless.
Other problems included battles between producers and the state
government over taxes on oil. A climax to this disorder came in 1938,
when workers of the Mid-Continent Oil Company of Tulsa went on a long,
difficult strike. The federal government offered little help in
solving these problems, as the oil industry continued to suffer during
the depression.
Congressman Disney, realizing that the future of the NRA might be
uncertain, began drafting a new bill in February 1935. It did not call
for total federal control of the industry, but instead encouraged
cooperation between the national government and the oil producing
states. Disney proposed that a federal petroleum board of five
members, one of whom would be Interior Secretary Ickes, be created to
determine the demand for crude oil consumption for the nation and to
divide the total equitability among the states. Rather than set
production quotas, he would instead set sales quotas, so that companies
could produce all of the oil they wanted but sell only amounts that had
previously been determined and agreed upon. Moreover, the federal
authority would not interfere as long as each state, as a whole,
complied with the measures. 2 The bill also called for heavier taxes on
imported oil. 3 The measure was supported by Senator Thomas and the
Independent Petroleum Association of America, whose President was
Tulsan Wirt Franklin, but faced opposition by other independents and
large oil companies who did not wish to have any kind of federal
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authority at allover oil production. While other bills that were
created during this period received varying support from government and
the oil interests, no significant legislation dealing with oil
production was ever enacted.
Tulsa had for some time been considered oil capital of the world.
It was home of the International Petroleum Exposition, which occurred
once a year and brought oil executives from allover the world, and it
was the headquarters of many large oil corporations and their
executives. Therefore, when in 1936, the federal government issued
indictments in Madison, Wisconsin, of 23 major oil firms and 58
individuals for violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Law for alleged
gasoline price fixing, there was little surprise when many Tuls&ns were
named in the warrants. The Tulsa companies that were listed included
the Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation, Skelly Oil Company, Barnsdall
Refining Corporation, and Deep Rock Oil Corporation, as well as their
top level executives and shareholders. The defendants were accused
specifically of combining and conspiring, beginning in 1935, to raise
and fix prices on gasoline sold in interstate commerce, principally in
ten middle western states. Other Oklahoma companies from Bartlesville,
Ponca City, and Blackwell were also indicted. 4
The accused, as well as the Tulsa Tribune, responded to the
charges by saying that they were simply doing what had been the
expected practice under the old NRA codes to maintain prices. By
fixing prices, they had been able to bring order to the industry.5 The
Tribune stated that while the leaders of the oil industry had proved
that they were better equipped to bring back prosperity than the
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politicians in Washington, those same New Dealers were instead
displeased because the oil leaders did not wait until President
Roosevelt could be re-elected in order to revive the NRA and set up a
federal bureau to run the petroleum business. The newspaper also felt
that those indictments were indirectly aimed at Republican presidential
candidate Alf Landon, who was an oil man himself. While the oil
executives had been working to fix their industry, the government
instead was trying to thwart their progress by bringing these charges. 6
These arguments proved to be unsuccessful, however, when seventeen
months later, jurors found thirty of the men and sixteen of the
companies guilty of violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Laws. Many from
Tulsa were included under the guilty verdict, including the Barnsdall
Refining Company, the Mid-Continent Oil Corporation, and the Skelly Oil
Company, as well as the executives associated with them. 7 Former NRA
director General Hugh Johnson stated his belief that the men were not
guilty, because given the difficulties faced by the oil industry at
that time, they were compelled to operate under the tenets of the first
Roosevelt recovery program. Therefore, the verdict was regrettable and
a contradiction of what the president had said was imperative to the
recovery of the industry and the nation. 8 Whether or not the oil men
and companies had actually participated in illegal price-fixing
practices, this well-publicized case offered further opportunities for
criticism of Roosevelt and his plans for a national recovery.
Other situations developed within the Tulsa petroleum industry.
In April 1937, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) began
organizing oil workers throughout the entire state. 9 Tulsa was
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designated a key city, as the union group began calling for a closed
shop within the industry there. lo Eventually, the movement spread to
the city's building and steel trades as well, as parades were formed in
order to encourage support. This union existence led to unrest, as oil
companies began experiencing additional difficulties in 1938.
The problems began in May of that year, when a declining demand
for crude oil and excessive stocks of gasoline led the Sinclair Company
to close plants in five cities, one of which was Sand Springs, a Tulsa
suburb' 11 In October the shutdown of a plant in nearby Barnsdall led
to the release of 225 more oil workers. 12 Then late in the year, CIa
employees of the Mid-Continent Oil Company, who had for six months been
demanding the establishment of arbitration machinery for labor
disputes, higher wages, and a more codified security system, considered
the possibility of going on strike. They made the decision on December
22, when workers walked off the job. 13
In what would be one of the longest strikes of the decade,
approximately 500 union members initially began picketing the refinery,
as well as several Mid-Continent filling stations throughout the
city.14 Many reports of violence surfaced, as men who did not wish to
join the strike were forced to wade across the Arkansas River to join
their fellow workers inside. IS By Christmas Day of 1938, Governor
Ernest Marland declared martial law and sent national guard troops to
disperse picketers. Guardsmen had the strikers move approximately two
blocks away, where they resumed their activities. 16
Two days later, a conference between officials of the Mid-
Continent Petroleum Corporation and an officer of the Oil Workers
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International Union had been arranged by a representative of the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in order to discuss the
situation. l ? The meeting was the first of several that would occur
over the next sixty-five weeks. The length of the strike is an
indication of the serious situation faced by the oil industry in Tulsa
and the rest of the country as a result of the depression t
overproduction, and an inability by anyone in government or business to
find a solution to the problem acceptable to everyone concerned. Even
as late as 1938, President Roosevelt, other New Dealers, state and
local officials, and oil leaders were unable to restore the industry to
what it had been before the depression.
The New Deal was not totally to blame, because the situation was
beyond what the federal government could have done to help anyway, and
had been since the late 1920s. The New Deal's attitude toward business
and labor did create an environment in which a strike could achieve a
greater level of success than previously, as was evidenced in the
automobile and steel industries. iS The oil industry as a whole would
continue to suffer, however, until it was needed in the mobilization
for World War II.
In other areas such as work relief, the New Deal continued to have
some success in Tulsa. Realizing that organizations such as the FERA
were not solving the problems of the economy, Roosevelt decided that a
new plan was necessary. He figured that a new form of relief that
attempted to secure work for the unemployed would be better than to
have the federal government issue a cash dole. In 1935 he and his
advisors decided to implement such a program, and that year, Congress
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passed the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act, which provided an
initial outlay of $4.8 billion for federal works projects. This money
would be used for the Works Progress Administration and, under the
direction of Harry Hopkins, would be spent by giving the unemployed a
security wage for the construction of mostly small scale projects. I9
The administrator for the WPA in Oklahoma was W.S. Key. The state
was divided into districts, each with its own WPA director, and for the
Tulsa district, it was former chamber of commerce president Cyrus
Avery. He began by outlining the principal policies of the program,
which included that eligible men would work five and one-half days a
week, not to exceed 140 hours per month; that wages would range from
$35 per month for unskilled workers to $75 for those considered
skilled; and that once a person had been on a WPA construction program
for at least 30 days, he would not be able to return to the direct
relief rolls. Until new WPA projects were approved, workers would
finish OERA projects that had previously been started. 2o
Following procedures that were similar to those of the PWA, Tulsa
officials began submitting project applications to the district office.
It would then either approve or reject the project and would send
approved ones on to the state office. By August 1935, the district
office had accepted fifteen work plans and was waiting on further word
from the next level. 21 Good news came in September when the state
learned that it would receive $50 million for WPA projects, $11 million
of which would be used for road building. Members of the Tulsa
district thought this was a good development, because Avery and many
members of his office staff were experienced in road construction work
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from former service on the state highway commission. 22 By mid-October,
Tulsa County had received approval by the national administration for
ten projects, which called for an expenditure of $164,000 and gave work
to 1,133 employees. 23
Already discouraged by the lack of progress made in Tulsa by the
PWA, chamber of commerce officials were quick to blame the WPA for not
giving the city the attention they thought it deserved. They stated
that while they did not favor all of the government spending that was
going on, that if it going to occur anyway, Tulsa should expend every
effort for the next year to share in it, because the city would have to
help pay the bill. The chamber director suggested that one way to
focus on the lack of attention Tulsa was receiving would be to begin an
advertising campaign comparing it to other cities and showing that it
was not getting its proportionate share. 24
Apparently having learned of this proposal, Cyrus Avery came to a
chamber meeting in November 1935 and responded to these ideas. He
explained that since June of that year, the WPA, in conjunction with
other local organizations, had under operation 38 separate projects in
Tulsa County, employing approximately 5,000 workers, at a cost of
$879,061. Of this amount, $319,629 went toward needed sewer projects
and $25,000 toward farm-to-market roads. In addition, a sewing room
program for the relief of distressed women was spending $115,268 in the
county and employing 966 females. The amount of $198,053 went toward a
drainage and malaria control program, while $308.000 was allocated for
levee improvement on the Arkansas River between Tulsa and Sand Springs,
a project that the chamber of co.merce had wanted for .any years. 25
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These facts, plus promises for future plans, helped show the chamber
that much indeed was being done for the city.
Once the WPA in Tulsa became organized, it provided many benefits.
After solving early problems concerning check distribution and
availability of tools and supplies, the WPA was able to employ many men
and women, particularly on road projects. The program went through
various periods of expansion and reduction, which tended to make it
difficult for people who at any time might suddenly be released.
Projects continually received approval, however, offering employment to
people in the city in varying degrees throughout the rest of the
decade.
Avery continued as head of the WPA district that included Tulsa
until June 1937, when W.E. Wood replaced him amid allegations that the
director had used WPA labor to construct a pond on his Nowata county
farm. During his tenure, Avery expended $5.5 million for the entire
district, which had gone for roads, schools, city buildings, flood
control, and numerous other projects. Wood, his replacement, had been
administrator for Oklahoma WPA district number three at Okmulgee. 26
One of the biggest obstacles Tulsa faced in getting WPA money was
its continued inability or unwillingness to raise matching funds. 27
This situation was similar to the one the city had faced when trying to
obtain PWA funds from the federal government. The chamber of commerce
formed a committee in an attempt to find a solution to the problem. It
looked at the possibilities of holding elections in order to vote for
the bonds necessary to match government WPA funds. 28 Committee members
had limited success, however, because city charter restrictions
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continued to limit the amount of bond indebtedness that was allowed.
Tulsa did not want to violate these provisions, so it was unable to
sponsor any large-scale construction projects.
Tulsa was still able to achieve positive results from the smaller
projects it received. From May 1, 1935 to May 1, 1936, the city
engineer's office spent $2,606,495 on the construction of sewers and
road paving. 29 By the end of the 1937 fiscal year, the WPA provided an
additional $1,109,302 for this type of construction. 3o Workers were
also involved in the removal of approximately 100,000 feet of street-
car tracks, and expenditures for schools exceeded $44,000. 31 Women
continued to participate in sewing rooms and nurseries within the city.
Although it did not provide as many employment opportunities, the
Federal Music Project in Tulsa was quite successful while it lasted.
It gave a total of 84 concerts to a total audience of 63,000 persons. 32
The Federal Writers' Project contributed to the American Guide Series
by writing Tulsa: AGuide to the Oil Capital. Although these and
other projects in the city did not solve the unemployment problem, the
WPA was one of the more beneficial New Deal programs for Tulsa.
While the WPA was experiencing some success, Tulsans hoped to get
greater help from the PWA than they had previously. This program had
been woefully inadequate during its first two years, and leaders
attempted to bring more benefits from it by 1938. These efforts
continued to bring the same disappointing results until 1937, when hard
work by Congressman Disney secured a huge $20,000,000 appropriation for
an extensive hydro-electric power plant to be built on the Grand River.
This project also included provisions for flood control in the region
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and benefited many other Oklahoma counties and certain border states,
as well as the city and county of Tulsa. The attainment of this broad
project, however, introduced new problems, especially political ones,
that would ultimately contribute to the decline of support for the New
Deal in the region.
One of the first proposals for PWA grants in 1935 called for slum
clearance removal in Tulsa, Oklahoma City, and Enid, which would then
be followed by low cost housing construction. This work called for an
appropriation of $4,000,000, but was immediately opposed by Governor
Marland. He preferred to implement his own ideas for subsistence
homesteads, under which he claimed twice as many families could benefit
than under the PWA plan. Marland also stated that property owners in
Oklahoma City had complained that the proposed program would destroy
rental values on lower class homes. He feared that federally
controlled housing would become a political football and that "once you
get those people in a building, you would never be able to get them
out."33
At the same time, the Tulsa Chamber of Commerce showed
considerable interest in low cost housing for both whites and blacks in
the city. It was also planning ways in which to improve houses that
already existed but that were in poor repair. 34 At that time, the area
in which the low cost housing could be built was occupied by an
incinerator, and chamber members began planning its removal and
replacement in another location with a new reduction plant. 35
Removal of the incinerator became one of three projects that the
city council planned to vote funds for under a bond issue. The other
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two included an Arkansas River sewage collection and disposal plant and
a railroad underpass, both of which were considered very necessary.
The commission had to work fast, because in order to receive matching
PWA grants, the work had to begin by December 15, which was only three
months away. Bond indebtedness for the city under the issues would
total $825,000. 36
Soon, however, it became clear that the results for Tulsa under
the PWA would be very similar to what they had been previously. In
late September, Senator Thomas received word from Washington that while
Oklahoma City had been included in the administration's housing
program, Tulsa and Enid had not. 37 Having learned that these actions
had occurred, Russell Rhodes, manager of the chamber of commerce, wrote
a letter explaining to Thomas that while Tulsa paid heavy taxes to the
federal government and to the state, not a single significant project
had been built there by the PWA. A tone of disapproval was clear in
the letter, as Rhodes asked Thomas to please do what he could to have
the low cost housing project reviewed. 38 Thomas then wrote to Jed
Johnson, another United States Congressman from Oklahoma, asking him to
explain to Secretary Ickes that a great deal of political support for
the administration could be lost in the Tulsa area if this project was
not approved. 39 Johnson was not successful, and Tulsa's poor failed to
benefit from low cost housing.
Other projects requested by Tulsa also were rejected, including
the removal of the incinerator, which was no longer necessary because
of the cancellation of the housing plans, as well as the Arkansas River
sewage plant and the railroad underpass. Also, there was no hope of
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getting any PWA assistance for the construction of two greatly needed
high schools, for which applications had previously been made. This
was because construction could not begin on them by the December 15
deadline, which was required for approval. In 1935 Tulsa received a
single grant of $12,892 for the completion of a road as its part of the
$4.8 billion relief fund. 4o
The Tribune believed that Tulsa's failure to obtain funds for all
of these projects was a result both of Washington politics and public
lethargy. It said that money was obviously going to places that were
of greater political necessity to the administration, but also that a
lack of coordination among various local groups in submitting projects
contributed to the inability to obtain any. It called for stronger
leadership in getting what Tulsa deserved. 41
Officials tried once again in 1936 to obtain PWA grants for two
high schools, a small one on the west side of the city and a larger one
on the east. The PWA responded as it had many times previously by
alternating between interest in and resistance to the application.
Tulsans had voted to sell $1.7 million worth of bonds to fund their
required 55 percent of the cost of the schools and expected a grant
of $600,000 to $1.3 million from the federal agency.42 In October the
city received $350,000 to assist in the building of the smaller school,
which was the first sizable grant to Tulsa County by the PWA.43 The
Tribune attributed this development to the fact that it was an election
year, and the date of that event was quickly approaching. 44
By the spring of 1937, when it appeared that no more money was
pending from the agency for the larger school, the school board was
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forced to consider an additional five-mill levy for its construction.
It approved the levy, which totalled approximately $484,000 and was
added to $700,000 that remained from the bond issue from the previous
spring. Less than one month later, President Roosevelt approved a PWA
grant of $632,091 for the new high school. While the funds were
appreciated, it left officials with the difficult problem of deciding
what to do with the now unnecessary money that had been obtained from
the additional construction levy.45
These problems and projects of the PWA for Tulsa were important,
but the most significant undertaking that related to this federal
agency in northeastern Oklahoma involved flood control, power
development, and navigation on the Arkansas River and its tributaries,
specifically the Grand River. From the early 1930s until the end of
the decade, officials of Tulsa, Vinita, other interested cities and
towns, Congressman Disney, and Senator Thomas all worked to obtain the
massive federal project for the region. The most recent activity had
come as a result of the 1934 Corps of Engineers' survey of the area in
order to determine whether such projects would be possible. While
flood control, power plant construction, and navigation had formerly
been treated as separate issues, they now had come together under one
plan, albeit one that changed often. As it usually had taken months
for other smaller projects to be acted upon, one as vast as this had
been under consideration for a couple of years. In 1935 it was clear
that much more time would be necessary before this project could become
a reality.
While flood control initially received the .ost attention, its
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importance by 1935 was being overshadowed by the possibilities of
hydro-electric power from the Grand River. The revival of interest in
this project came from a favorable rating given to it by a Mississippi
Valley committee and Corps of Engineer army reports. The project
appeared to be in line with President Roosevelt's plans for rural
electrification, as it would provide electricity for farms as well as
cities. Farmers were unable to pay the high rates charged by private
utility companies and would greatly benefit fro. lower rates that the
new plant would provide. 46 Also, because the PWA application asked for
$16,000,000, the possibilities for providing thousands of jobs for a
long period of time added an even greater impetus for its approval.
The Grand River hydro-electric project first had to receive
approval from the Oklahoma legislature before it could receive
consideration in Washington. This occurred on April 24, 1935, but
Representative Glade Kirkpatrick of Tulsa attached an amendment stating
that power from the plant could be sold only at wholesale rates. 47
Kirkpatrick was a supporter of the private utility interests who wanted
to kill the project and knew that by adding such an amendment, there
was a chance that the proposal might not be considered favorably by
President Roosevelt. He was correct. In September the PWA gave its
clearance to the project, amid battles between Ickes and Hopkins over
whether relief money should be spent for large-scale construction or
for smaller building projects. 48 When Disney took the application to
the president for final approval, however, Roosevelt refused t because
under the Kirkpatrick amendment, the only way that anyone who wanted
electricity from the plant could get it would be to build his own power
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lines and connect them himself. This was unacceptable to the
president, who told Disney that the amendment must be removed. 49
This condition was met, but not until after the state primary
elections in the summer of 1936. In the meantime, Disney and the
people of Northeastern Oklahoma had to endure additional surveys of the
project site by army engineers, whose disapproval also could have
killed the project's chances. Finally, in February 1937, as a result
of a favorable recommendation of the National Resources Committee and
new information showing that large amounts of water in addition to
power could be sold to oil companies, Disney renewed his drive for
action on the project. 50 Seven months later in September, after seven
years of effort by Congressman Disney, President Roosevelt approved a
$20,000,000 allocation for the hydro-electric project. It would
operate under the Grand River Power Authority, which had been created
by the state legislature in 1935. The plan included provisions for
flood control that had been approved by army engineers late in 1934.
It was supposed to be a self-liquidating project, which would provide
jobs and power throughout the region, including nearby Tulsa. 51
Upon learning that the project was now a reality, Disney responded
by saying, "1 am elated beyond expression! It has been a long hard
pull and 1 am proud to have been its sponsor."52 He believed that in
addition to the other benefits it brought, new industries would be
attracted to Oklahoma because of the availability of cheaper power.
Also, he thought that it would help solve the relief problem in the
eastern part of the state. 53 It appeared that the New Deal might
finally be making a significant impact in the region and on Tulsa.
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It soon became clear, however, that new problems would come as a
result of the Grand River Dam, especially political ones that would
permanently inhibit future progress of the New Deal within the state
and the city. With an election year on the horizon, Disney considered
using his accomplishments in an effort to win a seat in the United
States Senate. Many regional newspapers also recognized this
possibility and openly discussed it in their pages. Disney had the
support of important organizations such as the Tulsa Chamber of
Commerce, which informed him that its members had unanimously voted to
commend and congratulate him on his success and accomplishments in
securing approval of the power and flood control project. 54 When
Senator Thomas realized that Disney was becoming very popular and that
the senate seat that would be available at the next election was his
own, he began developing a plan in which he might share in the credit
for the dam project.
Jno Logan, a United States Marshal located in Tulsa and close ally
of Thomas, started looking for a way in which this could be done. He
explained to the senator that Disney should not be getting all of the
credit, because Thomas had introduced in the Senate three separate
amendments to the Grand River Dam bill, without which the project could
not have been approved. 55 The senator initiated a publicity campaign
by explaining this fact to the newspapers. He said that he did not
want all of the credit for getting the project for Oklahoma, but that
it should be divided between him and Disney.56
The political situation became further complicated in the spring
of 1938, as a result of the defeat of President Roosevelt's
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reorganization bill. The president had viewed reorganization of the
executive branch as one of his top priorities, because he thought it
would save money and provide better management. Roosevelt was
beginning to recognize, however, that his proposals were losing support
in Congress, and more evidence of this came as the reorganization bill
was defeated. 57
In the Oklahoma delegation, Senator Thomas voted for the bill, but
in a surprising reversal of loyalty, Disney voted against it in the
House. He argued on the floor that the bill did not have the support
of the people, either rural or urban, because they feared that it might
lead to the possibility of an American executive dictatorship. Due to
the fact that dictatorships were arising in other countries at that
time, passage of the reorganization bill, which contained no provisions
for depression relief anyway, would only raise suspicion and be
counterproductive. 58 Disney's claims that there was a lack of support
for the bill did have some merit in Tulsa, because both of the city's
major papers had printed seething articles rebuking it, the president,
and Thomas for voting in its favor. 59
Speculation abounded about why Disney made his decision. One
theory was that he had formed an alliance with Gomer Smith, another
congressman from Oklahoma and one who had also voted against the
reorganization bill, with the hope that Smith would help him defeat
Senator Thomas in the senate race. Another possibility was that Disney
realized that he did not have enough political strength to beat Thomas,
but instead saw that by supporting Smith for the senatorial seat, he
would be able to use that alliance to help him in the House. A third
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was that Disney had finally broken with Roosevelt, because he had tired
of the attention that Thomas was receiving from the president despite
the hard work he himself had consistently done in loyal support of New
Deal policies. 6o
Those who had found this third reason most credible had
irrefutable proof of it in the summer of 1938, when Roosevelt
accompanied Thomas to Oklahoma in a move to help the senator's re-
election campaign. One of the stops included a dedication of the Grand
River Dam by the president. In a speech at Oklahoma City, he gave full
credit for the $20,000,000 dam to the "persistent efforts of myoId
friends, Senator Thomas and Senator [Josh] Lee (also of Oklahoma)."
This statement occurred as Disney sat and listened on the speaker's
platform. 61
Disney's reaction to the speech was one of complete astonishment.
He figured that they must be "awfully hard up" in trying to elect
Thomas to do such a thing because the only thing he had ever done was
to oppose the dam. "The truth of the matter is that I spent seven
years working on the dam," he explained, ft ••• Senator Thomas
introduced the amendment I had prepared in the senate . That was
all there was to it - I spent seven years working on it and Senator
Thomas spent seven seconds."62
The Grand River Dam project was one that involved a great deal of
work by many people, and it was very beneficial to those who lived in
eastern Oklahoma. For the next few years after its approval, its
construction faced many problems because of delays, strikes, and the
disapproval of Leon Phillips, who was elected governor in 1938. At the
97
same time, it endured and exists as a New Deal project that still
generates power for the region today. But it also .arks a turning
point in the political support given to Roosevelt and his policies by
what had been a very loyal Congressman Disney. Fro. that point on, he
was lukewarm at best toward the president's ideas.
After the dam's dedication many of Roosevelt's constituents in
eastern Oklahoma, who felt that their congressman had been cheated out
of the credit they believed he deserved, also reversed the support they
had given to the president. Support for Roosevelt had already been
declining, and this situation not only hurt him, but helped Disney in
his election bid against a Thomas supporter in 1938. What might have
been an accomplishment that could really have built goodwill for the
New Deal in Tulsa and the surrounding region backfired and led to a
continuing decline of support for those policies.
Another issue that concerned Tulsans in the 1930s was the plight
of the elderly. Answering a general public concern over the condition
of this group, who had few chances at securing gainful employment and
almost no chance at receiving aid from public or private sources,
President Roosevelt signed the Social Security Act in 1935. It
provided for a compulsory old-age insurance program funded by employer
and employee contributions, as well as a federal-state unemployment
compensation program and assistance for mothers of dependent children
and the blind. 63 This act was immensely popular in Oklahoma, so much
so that by 1938 almost 110,000 residents were covered by the program at
a cost of $14,000,000. 64 This popularity, however, did not keep the
Social Security Board from cancelling the program in the state in March
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1938, when it found serious abuses, such as how funds were allocated to
people who were not qualified to receive them. Whether these abuses
were due to ineptitude or fraud, the people of the state and of Tulsa,
who had come to rely on this aid, found themselves without it for
several months as a result of the state's inability to abide by the
act's procedures.
Senator Thomas announced in February that Oklahoma was to be cut
off from the grants, because the federal board was not satisfied that
the state security apparatus for distribution of the funds was
acceptable or that all persons receiving such grants were legally
entitled to them. The board believed that possibly up to $3,000,000 in
illegal old age payments had been made. If this amount was correct,
perhaps one-half of Oklahoma's future federal grants could be
withheld. 65 The federal board's main criticisms were that the state
commission had not delegated full administrative authority to its
director, that a merit plan had not been set up for personnel, and that
an assistant director, trained in social work, had not been appointed.
By October the commission was still squabbling over how to fulfill the
second two demands. 56
Eventually, the commission found solutions to the problems that
were acceptable to the Social Security Board, and funds were returned.
These problems with the Social Security Act provide further evidence
that Oklahomans were unable to take advantage of a New Deal program due
to the ineffectiveness of the state leadership to implement it
properly. Aside from the problems in 1938, however, the Act proved to
be one of the most popular of Roosevelt's programs in Oklahoma. By
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1960 the state had the highest per capita welfare expenditure and the
highest percentage of a state budget committed to welfare in the
nation. 67 Social security also provides a primary example of how a New
Deal program has endured to present times. so much so that people balk
at the idea of its elimination. For all of the criticism Roosevelt's
ideas received by the end of the 19308, social security continued to be
popular and it remains as a legacy of the former president in Tulsa and
throughout the nation.
As in 1934, it is possible to measure the support of President
Roosevelt and the New Deal in Tulsa by examining the results of
elections in both 1936 and 1938. and especially those for state and
federal offices. City elections were less indicative, because aside
from listing his accomplishments in bringing WPA money and jobs to
Tulsa, Mayor Penny pledged to confuse neither state nor national issues
with the problems that faced his city.68 The focus of the municipal
elections was over who would be the police commissioner, as Penny was
easily able to retain his office as mayor in both election years. He
did this in 1936 by promising to operate the city on a cash basis, to
oppose issuing bonds, to keep public expenditures at a minimum, and to
oppose new forms of taxation; and in 1938 by favoring a merit system in
civil service for city employees, a new charter for the city, and the
establishment of a free venereal disease clinic to be financed by the
city.69 While Penny said that he opposed issuing bonds, he had
supported them many times in the past in order to obtain WPA and PWA
money, including the promotion of a $100,000 bond issue as Tulsa's
participation to get more than $100,000 in WPA and other federal aid. 7o
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The presidential and senatorial elections of 1936 help illustrate
how Tulsans responded to decisions that related to national and state
policies. Their Democratic choices for the senate seat included anti-
New Deal incumbent Thomas Gore; freshman Congressman Josh Lee; Gomer
Smith, who ran on a Townsendite platform; and Governor Marland, who
decided to run for the office half way through his term at the state
capital.
Lee, who had been elected to the House from the Norman district
for the first time just two years before, was an ardent supporter of
the New Deal, and his platform included helping farmers earn a higher
margin of profit, securing low priced power by such means as the Grand
River project, shorter hours and higher wages for workers, and the
furthering of other of President Roosevelt's policies. Gore, who had
consistently opposed Roosevelt's ideas, called attention to the
$40,000,000 a day cost of government and could see "signs of
retrenchment" through the President's budget message. 71 Marland also
had been a strong supporter of the New Deal, although his attempts to
create one in Oklahoma had been largely unsuccessful. He was
interested in reducing interest rates and creating an old age pension
system. 72
The other important decisions the city faced were in the election
of a president and a congressman of the first district. The main
aspirants in the Democratic primary for this latter contest included
Wesley Disney and A.F. Sweeny. The general consensus was that whoever
won in the Democratic primaries in both the senate and congressional
races would also win in the general election, because the strength of
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the Republican party in Oklahoma had dwindled significantly during the
19308.
Tulsans showed in the primaries that their support for the New
Deal was beginning to waver, because of their selection of Gore, with
8,372 votes, with Smith a close second at 7,662. New Deal advocates
Lee and Marland received 5,939 and 5,377 respectively.73 The attitudes
of Tu18ans were more revealing when looking at the state as a whole,
where Lee had come in first with 166,197, leaving Marland and Smith
battling for second and Gore coming in a distant fourth with 91,724. 74
Tulsans continued to be satisfied with the work of Disney, giving him
12,215 Yotes, a significant margin over Sweeny's second place count of
4,802. Republican senate hopeful Herbert Hyde won his primary with
only 2,048 Yotes, while Disney's November opponent Bailey Bell could
muster only a slim 3,176. 75 In the senate runoff, Lee ultimately faced
Marland and defeated him in Tulsa and in the rest of the state. 76
In the November election, despite tireless campaigning by the
Tribune against Roosevelt, the president continued to be very popular
in the city and county, even though his policies were not. The
president defeated Landon by a vote of 40,995 to 28,294, gaining 59
percent of the totel, which represented an actual increase of 1 percent
over what he had received in Tulsa in the 1932 election. Tulsans also
gave Lee 60 percent of the total for the senate race over Republican
Herbert Hyde and three other candidates. Congressman Disney received a
majority, garnering 36,180 to Republican Jo Ferguson's 26,912. 77 While
Tulsa and Oklahoma joined forty-six other states in returning a
Democratic president and congressional majority, the city also showed
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in the senate primary that it would no longer accept fully all that the
administration represented.
In 1938 reaction to the race for Oklahomats governor and the other
senate seat held by Elmer Thomas provided further evidence of this
growing sentiment. Democratic candidates for governor included former
state speaker of the house Leon Phillips; former WPA director and New
Deal supporter W.S. Key; three term veteran of the state legislature,
Ira Finley; former governor and Roosevelt-hater, William Murray; and
Jack Walton, who had previously also served as governor and been
impeached. 78
Murray, Phillips, and Key quickly emerged as the front-runners.
Murray's attitude toward the federal government by that time was no
secret, as he had opposed Roosevelt and his policies ever since he had
run against the president in 1932. The majority of Murray's support
came from farmers, who had represented the focus of his constituency
ever since he had first run for political office in Oklahoma. Key was
strongest in the eastern part of the state and also among those for
whom he had provided jobs through the WPA. Although he was a
conservative Democrat, Phillips was considered to be a friend of labor
and often proclaimed his loyalty to the president and his policies.
Still, he had often been critical of Marland's "little New Deal" while
speaker of the house. His following came from the state's western
counties, but more importantly, the urban centers of Tulsa, Oklahoma
City, Shawnee, Okmulgee, and Muskogee. 79
In what was up to that time one of the closest gubernatorial races
ever in Oklahoma, Phillips won the primary with 178,136 votes, with Key
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in second with 174,938, and Murray third with 146,534. 80 In an unusual
circumstance for the state, the ultimate decision was probably due to a
city, Tulsa, rather than a rural area. In Tulsa, Phillips received
13,701 to Key's 8,720. 81 It appears that the city's residents approved
of Phillips's conservative philosophy and his promises to eliminate
waste in government and the huge state debt, and to repeal unnecessary
taxes. 82 They also chose a nominee whose eventual support for the New
Deal was never more than verbal. Phillips had, according to James
Scales and Danney Goble, "a decided hatred of government spending,
centralization of power, and political realignment - in sum, everything
that the New Deal represented."83
The Democratic candidates for the senate race for 1938 in Oklahoma
included incumbent New Dealer Elmer Thomas, Ernest Marland, and Gomer
Smith. While Disney had entertained thoughts of running for the seat,
he instead chose to try to keep his old place in the House of
Representatives when he realized that he did not have enough state-wide
support. Thomas, who had received Roosevelt's endorsement, and Marland
were both supporters of the president's policies. Smith had been a
follower of Francis Townsend and, while considered a radical, received
the support of both of Tulsa's major newspapers. While by 1938 both
newspapers were considered conservative, they still preferred Smith
over the more bitterly despised New Dealers. 84 The Tribune was
particularly disgusted with Thomas, due to his vote in favor of the
president's reorganization bill. 8s
The people of Tulsa County apparently agreed with the two
e Whlele the state gave Thomas 62,000 votes more thanpublicatIons.
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Gomer Smith and approximately 137,000 more than Marland, Tulsa voters
gave Smith 14,086, Thomas 10,677, and Marland 4,149. 86 This senatorial
vote indicates that many of the city's residents were losing faith in
the president's program. This observation received further
confirmation in the general election in November 1938. While Phillips
and Disney received their expected majorities in Tulsa County, voters
there barely gave Thomas the edge with 16,207 votes, over a count of
16,142 to Republican opponent Harry Glasser. 87 Thomas won due to the
overall state counts, but Tulsans appeared to be looking less toward
what the New Deal had to offer and more toward a more conservative
alternative.
In the period from 1935 to 1938, the support of Tulsans for the
New Deal declined. As early as 1935, members of the chamber of
commerce were suggesting that a full page advertisement be run in the
newspaper to show that Tulsa was not getting any benefits from
governmental programs. This idea came as they learned that no
allotment had been made for building two new high schools and also that
the city's plans for low-cost housing would not be approved. They
wondered why projects totalling $23,000,000 were approved for Texas
within a fifteen-day period, while at the same time, eastern Oklahoma
had not received any support in Washington, D.C. S8 The Tribune
repeated its belief regularly that the reason Tulsa was not getting any
help from the administration was because the president knew that he had
enough votes in the city and in the state to guarantee him the majority
there, so he did not waste any relief dollars on that region. Instead,
he provided government funds for places in the United States that were
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questionable in their support for him, and this was an attempt to "buy"
their votes. 89
While there might be a certain degree of accuracy to these claims,
certain problems did exist in Tulsa that contributed to its inability
to benefit from New Deal funds. Due to provisions in the city charter
that limited the maximum amount of bond indebtedness that was allowed,
Tulsa often faced difficulties in providing matching funds that were
required by various New Deal agencies. When city officials were able
to locate funds for bond issues, they did not have the support of the
people. This occurred late in 1938, when the city proposed a massive
$2,153,000 issue, which was to provide funds for extensive street,
water, and sewer projects that would also receive help from the PWA and
WPA.90 The bond issue failed, because people who owed taxes were not
allowed to vote, and this significantly limited the voter turnout. 91
Whether for reasons of inability or unwillingness, Tulsa did not create
an economic policy that was conducive to getting the attention of the
New Dealers in Washington. This situation, when combined with a state
government that constantly worked at odds with the federal
administration, certainly hindered Tulsa's ability to share in relief
programs.
The New Deal continued to be incapable of returning Tulsa, and the
nation as a whole, to its pre-depression economic situation. In 1936
the Tribune reported that while Tulsa County had received slightly less
than $28,000,000 from all relief programs to that date, second in the
state only to Oklahoma County, there had been no reduction in the
number of people receiving relief in comparison to the number for 1933.
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In 1933 the newspaper showed that 7,842 persons and families received
some kind of aid, but in 1936, 7,891 did as well. 92 A Works Progress
Administration Unemployment Survey for 1937 showed that 7,698 persons
were on relief for that year, and this survey did not include people
who were getting aid from the HOLe, PWA, and other agencies that the
newspaper had included in its calculations. 93 The unemployment picture
continued to look dim and was not improving noticeably due to the
efforts of the New Deal.
At the same time, certain improvements within Tulsa did occur.
The city commission never again faced the kind of budgetary problems
it had in 1933. 94 Building permits increased steadily, from $2,586,354
in 1935 to $6,015,494 in 1937. During the period from 1935 to 1938,
property assessments increased from $101,238,554 to $106,232,925. 95 For
the same period, bank debits grew from $1,229,478,299 to
$1,630,591,444. 96 These gains were modest and did not reach the levels
of 1929, but they showed significant growth over the lows for 1932 and
1933. The increases were probably partially a result of the New Deal,
but also occurred in conjunction with the slow, general recovery that
was happening in many places throughout the United States.
While the New Deal was less effective for the economic improvement
of Tulsa, it still had an important impact. The WPA built many of the
city's public roads, sewers, and other structures. The Grand River
Dam, while slow in receiving approval, was a huge PWA expenditure and
still provides electricity for much of northeastern Oklahoma.
Roosevelt's Social Security Act was very popular and also continues to
exist in Tulsa and the rest of the country as an even more extensive
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program than he originally intended. The city also was turning to the
federal government for assistance .ore often than it ever had before,
such as when Mayor Penny asked Roosevelt for $2,500,000 in relief funds
in 1936. 97 In 1935 Mrs. Agnes Hamilton, case supervisor for the Family
Relief and Service Association, explained to city and county officials
how depression and government policies were changing social work
standards. Rather than dictating ideas and parceling relief out to
needy families, social workers were relying more on science and
psychology and learning to suggest, rather than dictate, to needy
clients. These clients were helped to work out permanent programs of
rehabilitation, rather than given temporary relief. 98 In these ways,
the New Deal continued to have an important impact on the city of
Tulsa.
The New Deal did not provide greatly needed low-cost housing in
the city, however, as it did in other cities. Both blacks and whites
who sought such a project were disappointed. Labor problems also
continued, such as when an outbreak between the AFL, the CIO, and non-
union workers left six business and $5,500 worth of property destroyed
in July 1937. 99 Then the huge Mid-Continent Oil Strike occurred in
1938 and affected thousands of families.
Support for the president also declined significantly by the end
of 1938. When he attempted his court-packing scheme in 1937, a Tribune
survey showed that 4,276 Tulsans were opposed to it, while only 390
approved. 100 The Tulsa Bar Association also condemned the plan, when
lawyers voted 118 to 15 against it. 10l The president lost much support
from Congressman Disney when he gave credit for the Grand River Dam to
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Senator Thomas. Tulsans showed in elections that they were becoming
less interested in New Deal government spending and more concerned with
conservative economics. The Tribune, which had long opposed the
president, observed that in 1938 the country was, "again, in a hell of
a mess," just as it had been in 1933. 102 In order to regain the
support of the people of Tulsa, Roosevelt would need a new opportunity.
This opportunity came with preparations for World War II.
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THE NEW DEAL IN TULSA: A DEPRESSION SOLUTION?
By the end of the 19308, the New Deal in Tulsa was in a definite
state of decline. The number of people receiving relief and the amount
of money spent for projects was continually being reduced. The
political attitudes of the state government, the first district's
congressman, and the city's population became much less favorable
toward President Roosevelt and his policies. The New Deal's ability to
return prosperity to Tulsa remained limited. Although at times
throughout the decade it had experienced some success, the New Deal was
no longer looked upon favorably in the city of Tulsa.
Problems began for the WPA as early as January 1939, when the
organization dropped 100 residents from its payrolls. Area supervisor
Charles Robertson said that this action was unavoidable, because the
city had shown an inability to provide its share of participation funds
for a street project upon which the workers had been laboring. 1 Tulsa
continued to be unable or unwilling to sponsor future WPA projects, and
its inaction led to the elimination of 240 more workers in April and
another 300 in May. By that time, the county's total number of people
employed by the WPA was 2,291, compared to over 3,000 who had worked in
the fall of 1938. 2
In June, four WPA officials came to Tulsa to talk with the chamber
of commerce. They told the board that the situation in Tulsa County
was serious as far as their organization was concerned. Mr. Beverly
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Goudilouck, speaker of the group, emphasized that the city must do
something in the way of providing bond issues, or else the county would
lose the projects it had, and they would go to other counties that had
projects ready to start. If Tulsa could not find a way to sponsor more
projects, approximately 1,600 relief employees would be discharged by
July 15. 3 Officials did what they could and while the WPA was never
eliminated in 1939, cuts continued to be made. The city never became
responsive to the idea of providing more money for WPA projects; in
late August 1939, for example, an estimated $500,000 WPA program for
the city was eliminated from its proposed budget. 4
As Tulsa dealt with those problems, it also tried to look for a
solution to the Mid-Continent Oil strike. In January charges were
filed against 130 strikers who had participated in various acts of
violence, including the dynamiting of company pipelines. When the
violence continued, Governor Phillips declared martial law and sent
additional National Guard troops to protect the area. s Phillips, who
was considered to be a friend of labor, decided to be an arbitrator for
talks between the two sides. Then late in January, the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB), which had been created by Roosevelt to
participate in solving problems between labor and management, announced
that it would hold hearings in Tulsa in an attempt to settle the
strike. 6
Violence continued, however, as acid was thrown into a non-
striking worker's home, and four Mid-Continent filling stations were
damaged. 7 Various plans were developed by the NLRB, Governor Phillips,
the oil company, and members of the CIa oil workers' union, but none of
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them satisfactorily resolved the dispute. One of the key issues was
over indictments that had been prepared against strikers who had been
involved in the early instances of violence. The workers' union
refused to contribute to a settlement until these indictments, then
totalling 143, had been withdrawn. 8 This did not happen and, by the
end of 1939, the strike continued. The NLRB acted as administrator and
often sided with the strikers, something the federal government would
not have done before the New Deal. 9 The strike was not settled until
early in 1940, after more than a year of violence and failed
agreements.
The Grand River Dam project, whose approval came after many years
of hard work by Tulsa Congressman Wesley Disney, soon faced opposition
by Governor Phillips. A fierce believer in state's rights, he assailed
the authority of the federal government to take land for the
development of the project, as well as for the construction of another
dam on the Red River. Senator Thomas warned representatives of the
governor that Oklahoma would be in danger of losing every type of
federal building project, and other benefits as well, if it insisted on
states' rights in connection with the development of the projects. 10
Ignoring these warnings, the governor tried to interfere in the
construction of the Grand River Dam whenever he could. In September
1939, he threatened to block construction unless the GRDA agreed to
replace state-built roads and bridges that would be destroyed under the
building plan.!! In November the PWA told the GRDA to accept this
requirement, but ultimately the courts favored the federal government
and its authority over the governor. 12 The Grand River Dam was built
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and began selling power in 1940. 13 This episode represents the
conservative backlash by the state government against the New Deal and
its impact on a massive project for northeastern Oklahoma.
When examining the overall impact of the New Deal on the city of
Tulsa, what conclusions can be drawn? Did the city receive any
benefits or was the New Deal hopelessly inadequate in its ability to
bring relief to Tulsa's depression-weary inhabitants? The final
analysis is mixed, because as in many other cities throughout the
United States, while Roosevelt's program did provide a measure of help,
it did not restore Tulsa to its pre-depression prosperity.
Economically, the New Deal was not successful in providing a
stimulus to Tulsa that would return the city to the same financial
level that it held in 1929. At the same time, however, the city showed
improvement, some of which must be attributed to the president's
policies throughout the 1930s decade. The level of wholesale trade for
Tulsa dropped from $102,407,000 in 1929 to $58,405,000 in 1935. Then
by 1939, it had increased back to $75,410,000. 14 In 1929 the value of
products manufactured by Tulsa business was $26,820,277. This figure
dropped to $10,995,838 in 1933, but by 1939 it had rebounded to
$22,670,597. 15 Bank debits dropped from just under $2,000,000,000 in
1929 to a comparatively abysmal $811,000,000 in 1933, but this amount
returned to just over $1.6 billion dollars by 1940. 16 A Department of
Commerce report describing the financial status of Tulsa's government
in 1939 explained that, in spite of slightly reduced revenues received
by the city, its income was sufficient not only to cover the total cost
payments of general government, but also to reduce substantially the
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city's debt. 17
Other indicators were not as favorable. The value of construction
work in 1929 was at $20,403,000. In 1939 the value of all construction
performed was only at $13,496,000, showing that this industry was not
able to overcome depression problems as well as others. 1S Property
assessments grew from a $101,000,000 low in 1933 to $105,000,000 in
1937, but it remained at this level for the next four years, still
significantly lower than the $150,000,000 level of 1930. 19 The oil
industry, while reaching more optimistic levels by the end of the
decade, still had been helped little by the New Deal. In addition,
population growth, which is often associated with improving economic
conditions, was almost nonexistent. This figure in Tulsa in 1930 was
141,258, but it grew only to 142,157 in 1940. 20 This represents an
increase of only 0.6 percent, while unemployment for the same period
grew from 7.5 percent to 11.8 percent. 21 The best conclusion that can
be drawn from this information is that while New Deal programs did slow
and perhaps even reverse the downward trend for Tulsa, it was not
"revolutionary" enough to propel the city to its pre-depression
situation.
In many parts of the United States, economic prosperity returned
with government spending that was associated with the preparation for
World War II. This was the case for Tulsa as well. The city had a
good airport, and Tulsans wanted to expand their ability to attract war
industries by improving this facility. Using the automobile industry
as an example of what had occurred after World War I, chamber of
commerce member Russell Hunt explained that air travel would be greater
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after the war than during it, and that those cities with modern air
travel facilities would have an industrial advantage over those who
were not quick to realize the possibilities. 22 Tulsans were eager to
take part in the National Defense program, and while as yet they had
not received any consideration from the War Department, the recent
completion of the Spartan School of Aeronautics, when combined with the
possibilities of improving airport facilities, brought the hope that
they might get the attention of the department's officials. Mayor C.H.
Veale began writing letters to Senator Thomas, explaining why Tulsa
would be an excellent choice for defense-related activities. 23
Positive results from this endeavor came in August 1940 when the
city received word that the War Department had approved funds through
the WPA for an airport project, which included building a hangar at the
Tulsa Municipal Airport to house the aviation squadron of the National
Guard, plus the construction of an additional hangar and a new
runway. 24 Even better news came when the chamber of commerce was
/
informed that Tulsa was being considered for one of four bomber
assembly plants that would be built in the central United States. The
airplane plant would cost between $10,000,000 and $15,000,000, and
would employ between 8,000 and 10,000 skilled workers. 25 The chamber
of commerce immediately began a campaign to get the plant and started
preparations for the building of housing, which might be needed in the
event of a population increase, as well as for the construction of
sufficient water and sewage capabilities. 26
To the excitement of the city's residents, the Tulsa Tribune
announced in February 1941 that the new bomber plant would adjoin the
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airport, as the site approval had been given by General C.H.
Rutherford of the U.S. Army.27 The bomber plant would be very good for
the economy of Tulsa, because it would employ people to build 1,200
four-engine bombers annually. It would also attract many smaller,
related businesses and would bring a great deal of attention to Tulsa's
growing aviation industry.
The approval of the plant brought other benefits as well.
Realizing that substantial expansion of the airport would be necessary
in order to be prepared for the construction of the factory, officials
began applying for federal funds with which they might contribute to
this effort. In late April 1941, approval from the WPA came for over
$600,000 worth of airport improvements, including the construction of
new runways, drainage and lighting facilities, and other projects. 28
At the end of October, Tulsa received PWA matching grants of $320,894
for the construction of water and sewer facilities that were now
necessary because of the bomber program. 29 Additional PWA and WPA
grants totalling hundreds of thousands of dollars came to the city to
help it prepare for its increasing participation in the national
defense program.
Because of the war and the existence in Tulsa of airport
facilities that gave it favorable attention by the War Department, the
city was able to develop, with the help of federal funds, a new
aviation industry. This industry remained and grew after the
conclusion of the war and was of key importance in providing jobs and
income to the city and its residents even until present times. The New
Deal had made certain, limited contributions to the economy, but the
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preparation for World War II was what led to recovery.
In terms of the significance of building programs in Tulsa during
the 1930s, the FERA, CWA, WPA, and PWA all left positive, permanent
marks on the city's infrastructure. The FERA and CWA contributed over
$3,000,000 in jobs and in building for important street and sewer
projects and for the construction of larger buildings by early 1935.
The WPA also contributed extensive funds for various smaller projects,
although Tulsa often had difficulties, due to charter restrictions, in
providing matching funds for any larger building. The PWA had little
to offer the city, until Congressman Disney was able to procure a
massive power and flood control project on the Grand River.
Much of this construction would not have been possible without the
New Deal, and its benefits are clear, both for the short and long term.
Many of these projects still exist, and they still serve in the same
capacity as they did in the 1930s. At the same time, Tulsa did not
benefit to the extent that many other cities, especially in the South,
did. Tulsa did not receive a new skyline, as did Kansas City, or many
other larger facilities that were built elsewhere.
One reason why Tulsa could not capitalize on relief funds was due
to p~oblems that existed within the state government. Animosity
between Governors Murray and Phillips and the federal government caused
problems in the state's ability to procure relief. When Murray had
authority over the distribution of funds early in the 1930s, he
continually directed it away from Tulsa and other urban areas and
instead used it for political purposes in rural parts of the state.
While Governor Marland tried to bring the New Deal to Oklahoma, his
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ineffectiveness as a political leader and his problems with the state
legislature kept this from occurring.
A second reason Tulsa did not benefit as well as it might have
from the New Deal was because restrictions within the city charter kept
the city from being able to vote bonds that were required as matching
funds for federal assistance. When Tulsans wondered why other cities
were receiving more money from Washington than they were, they were
quick to blame the president and his advisers, because they believed
that Roosevelt was concerned with paying attention only to those places
whose votes he had to "buy," because of their questionable support.
Although there might be some basis for this argument, it is also true
that Tulsans were unwilling to change their municipal laws, such as
other cities did, so that they could raise matching funds and therefore
be entitled to greater amounts of government aid. Roosevelt gave more
attention to cities that took the steps to participate in his programs.
Although Tulsa at times was able to raise matching funds, usually its
government was committed to a balanced budget and opposed to deficit
spending. Even if it had made the statutory changes necessary to get
more help, Tulsa still probably would not have received the treatment
that larger, more prominent cities such as Boston and Kansas City
received, but it also might have benefitted more greatly from New Deal
programs such as the PWA.
Politically, the New Deal had fallen into disfavor with Tulsans by
the late 1930s. The city's residents had shown a preference for more
conservative politics with their choice of Governor Phillips in 1938.
Although they had shown support for Roosevelt by giving him a majority
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in 1932 and 1936, this changed in 1940. In the November election for
president in that year, Tulsans turned out in record numbers and gave
Republican nominee Wendell Wilkie a 7,000 vote majority.3o For the
first time since the depression began, Tulsans were not part of the
majority that gave Roosevelt the presidency.
Congressman Disney's opposition to Roosevelt and the New Deal also
was becoming apparent by 1939. An Oklahoma City newspaper noticed
this, reporting that "apparently [Disney] is making a start toward
loosening the Rooseveltian shackles which have bound him so tightly to
the New Deal for so long."31 This report came as a result of the
congressman's vote against a presidential proposal to spend additional
billions to stimulate employment and business. Then, in a response to
the Townsend bill, which would have provided $200 a month to retirees
who were over sixty, Disney's comment was, "Where are [we] going to get
the money?" He also hinted toward a position favoring states' rights;
he felt that only the states could end this "spending orgy," because,
"Congress apparently is going to continue to spend until someone, some
place, somewhere halts us."32 Disney's attacks on federal expenditures
ultimately led concerned WPA workers to picket his home. Carrying
signs written with the words, "You Betrayed Us," they compelled a
rather surprised Disney to explain that he had always supported the
WPA, but thought that recent calls for other spending projects were
unneeded. 33 It appeared by that time that Roosevelt would no longer be
able to assume that he had unqualified support in Tulsa or from its
congressman.
It is possible to draw additional conclusions about the impact and
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importance of the New Deal in Tulsa. As in other cities throughout the
United States, blacks had to endure the depression and often were
excluded from aid that the New Deal provided. Although sources reveal
little about the situation of blacks in Tulsa, it is still possible to
make certain observations. Unlike places such as Kansas City, where
this minority group was allowed to benefit considerably from New Deal
relief, blacks in Tulsa did receive some help, but it was limited.
The city's black population had experienced success in the field
of domestic work, but began feeling the negative effects of the
depression in 1931. As has been explained, African-Americans had few
places to turn for relief, because most charity organizations in Tulsa
served the needs of whites only. Sociology student Francis Burke
believed that the principal reason for this situation was that the
strict segregation of races in Tulsa had resulted in a lack of
understanding of common interests. The white community did not appear
to pay much heed to the presence of the black citizens in the culture
of the city. Consequently, no provisions were made when no needs were
known to exist. 34 Therefore, blacks were left to themselves to deal
with economic hardships, something that was difficult when they faced
economic problems in the best of times as well.
The establishment of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration
and the Works Progress Administration marked the first step toward
recognition of the needs of blacks for social welfare services.
Therefore, this is an instance when the actions of the federal
government under the New Deal affected current and future relations
between whites and blacks in the city of Tulsa. According to Burke,
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"The servl-ces t dgran e • • • consisted almost entirely of direct
material assistance, [and] in this respect there [was] no
discrimination -in Tulsa on the basis of race. tl35 She indicates that
during 1934-1935, approximately 6,000 families in Tulsa received relief
from these agencies, 1,500 of whom were black. 36 Moreover, the
Oklahoma Emergency Relief Administration, (OERA), operating as the arm
of the FERA, provided jobs for eight black case workers, who handled
approximately the same number of cases as white workers and awarded
approximately the same amount of funds for relief purposes. 37
Burke determined that in 1936, more than 50 percent of all Tulsa
blacks were dependent upon either public or private social agencies for
assistance, while less than 30 percent of whites were in this dependent
class. A problem blacks shared with whites was that under the OERA,
they received a level of aid that was considerably below their minimum
requirements. In one of her own surveys, she found that of 100 black
families, 77 received less than $7.00 a month, while the average
received was $4.77. The average household in these dependent families
consisted of 4.03 persons, which provided an average of only $1.14 per
person per month. 38 Also, in order to receive any assistance,
applicants could become eligible only after having exhausted all of
their personal resources. Every material possession of the client,
exclusive of personal clothing, was required to be mortgaged or sold.
This requirement was particularly destructive to clients whose
remaining resources were necessary for any future adjustment and tended
to insure permanent dependence on relief. 39
Conditions improved under the WPA. Workers who were transferred
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to this program in 1935 received from $35.00 to $68.00 a month for work
requiring various levels of skill. Blacks were paid on the same basis
as whites, and there was no racial discrimination except in
administrative and supervisory positions. A benefit of this agency for
blacks came when a community center for them was built in their
neighborhood by the WPA, providing recreational opportunities on a
community basis irrespective of attachment to relief rolls. Its
activities were varied, but estimates showed that within a year, more
than 1,000 persons had participated in its programs, and the center had
an average daily attendance of 100 individuals. It was staffed by six
black workers who had received college training and experience in
teaching or social work. 40 The WPA and FERA also provided jobs for
blacks on public projects and in sewing rooms.
Thus the influence of the New Deal on Tulsa's black community was
important. It brought that group new forms of social welfare that it
had never had access to before, and it also helped alter the relations
between blacks and whites in the city, because each racial group was
now becoming more aware of the other as they began working on relief
projects. What the New Deal did not do, however, was to give any kind
of prosperity to blacks or to ease immediately the strict segregation
they faced. Also, as cuts were made in programs such as the CWA or
WPA, blacks were usually the first to be released from work.
An indication of the limited ability of the New Deal in helping
blacks economically can be determined by examining population and
employment figures for the 1930s. In 1930 the black population in
Tulsa was 15,203, 9,305 of whom were considered to be a part of the
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labor force. In 1940 the total black population was almost identical
at 15,151, but only 8,355 were in the labor force. In 1930 7.5 percent
of the white labor force was unemployed, while 8.6 percent of the total
black population was as well. 41 In 1940, while 10.6 percent of whites
in the labor force were unemployed, the number of jobless blacks had
risen to a very high 20.4 percent. 42 Although blacks were receiving
new sources of relief, it was not enough to solve serious unemployment.
The New Deal did not solve the housing problem that existed in
black neighborhoods, but it did help focus the attention of whites on
what had become a very bad situation. In discussions with FHA
authorities over what to do about a shortage of housing in the black
sections, city officials decided to survey the conditions in those
areas. 43 A study by the Tulsa Institute of Governmental Research found
that extremely poor, unsanitary conditions existed there. The
institute's chairman stated that "No city of this size can afford to
permit a continuation of health conditions such as we have found."44
They had discovered filth and waste dripping from battered garbage
cans. Many of the homes had no water or sanitary connections. Because
of the segregation laws, several families were forced to live in single
dwelling units. The city did not collect garbage in the areas, and
left that job to private contractors, whose services had been almost
nonexistent. 45 In one cases, up to 31 persons living in apartment
houses all had to use the same outdoor toilet. 46
The condition of the black neighborhood truly appeared to have
been a surprise to city officials, and they immediately began to try to
find a solution to the problem. They instituted a "pay-as-we-go"
4
129
policy to spend $60,000 on equipment for the area and proposed a new
rate scale for garbage collection there as well. 47 They proposed a
federal housing project, which was believed to be the most direct means
of solving the problem of inadequate sanitation and overcrowded living
conditions. 48 Assistance finally came as a result of the war, when the
federal government helped the city construct approximately 4,000 homes.
Although the primary purpose of the homes was to serve families who
were expected to fill defense-related jobs, it was anticipated that
after the war, if workers left the community, the homes could be turned
over to black residents, thus helping solve their chronic housing
problem. 49
This was, of course, a small step in solving a big problem. The
New Deal did, however, bring the attention of the larger community to
the problems of blacks. It left the local government to decide how
relief would be spent on them, but the New Deal required officials to
allow blacks to participate in relief projects. By taking steps such
as those that uncovered the sanitation and housing problems where
blacks lived, it encouraged whites to take future steps in providing
for this population group. In Tulsa, where the two racial groups had
interacted only very rarely before, now whites and blacks would begin
to become more aware of each other.
The housing situation for whites was better, but only as it
related to the FHA, as no low cost housing program had ever been built
for them by the New Deal either. In 1935 the chamber of commerce
reported that as of August of that year, Tulsa was leading the United
" d 1 "t 50States in the number of FHA-Insure oans per capi a. Therefore,
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Tulsa had enthusiastically joined other cities in participating in
Roosevelt's plan for long-term, low interest home loans backed by the
federal government. The percentage of total families owning their own
homes actually increased from 1930 to 1940, growing from 38.1 percent
to 40.8 percent. 51 The construction of low-cost housing would not
begin, however, until 1968, when the city formed its first housing
authority.
The New Deal did not alter the political situation in Tulsa.
There was no political machine there such in Chicago, Memphis, Kansas
City, or Boston. While Tulsa's mayors and commissioners did what they
could to obtain New Deal funds, the emphasis in Tulsa tended to relate
to local problems, especially those associated with crime. Because of
this, Tulsa received little attention from President Roosevelt. The
president had most of his dealings with Tulsa through its congressional
representatives and with the state government. As discussed
previously, this situation probably hindered Tulsa's ability to receive
more New Deal help.
The provisions for labor under the New Deal influenced the
development of labor organizations in Tulsa. Both the AFL and the CIa
came to the city and struggled against each other to organize its
workers. The CIO was successful at organizing oil workers, who
represented one of the largest labor blocs in Tulsa, and leading them
in a long strike against the Mid-Continent Oil Corporation. Such a
strike would have been impossible before the 1930s. The group also
interacted with the NLRB, which was a part of President Roosevelt's
answer to the failed NRA.
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Other changes occurred in Tulsa as a result of the New Deal as
well. As in many other communities, the process of distributing relief
came more under the control of those trained in the social sciences,
professionals who were interested more in the rehabilitation of the
client than in previous charity solutions. Social security existed and
grew in Tulsa, as it did throughout the United States. While these are
important, one of the most significant changes that occurred was in the
relationship between Tulsa, and other cities, and the federal
government. In the future, Tulsa would turn to Washington, D.C. more
often than it had previously. The Tribune acknowledged this process as
early as May 1933. Noticing how several cities had been turning to
Uncle Sam for relief, the newspaper realized that the federal
government was seeking broader powers than it had possessed before. In
an editorial, it commented that "The old order, under which local
governments were to all intents and purposes completely independent,
seems to be dissolving with amazing speed. A new lineup is in the
making, and it may produce changes that will alter the whole face of
our society."s2
The New Deal did not end the depression in Tulsa. As late as
Christmas Eve, 1938, county commissioners were requesting an increase
in the relief fund to aid 2,400 families. 53 The city continued to
struggle with bond indebtedness, problems with the state government,
and an inability to attract the attention of New Dealers in Washington.
But as has been indicated here, the New Deal altered life in the city
and relations with the federal government, much as it did throughout
the nation, and many of the changes endured. It did not represent a
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revolution, and in many ways, Tulsa benefited from the New Deal less
than did other places. The city also was fortunate in having the
resources and a population that helped it rebound more successfully
after the initial crisis than did other cities. Tulsans supported the
president and his ideas until they no longer seemed to work. Economic
rescue finally came with the preparation for the war, and this event
helped build a strong aviation industry to work alongside Tulsa's
creator, the oil industry. The New Deal's significance came not in its
immediate attempts, but in the way it altered Tulsa from its isolation
as a thriving boom town to its future participation in a larger
national order.
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